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AFTER MOORE v. MOYLE; THEN WHAT?
John D. DeFeo and Richard M. Spencer*
W ITHIN SEVEN months after the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of Moore v. Moyle,' the Supreme
Court of the State of Iowa re-examined the state of its own views
on the subject of the immunity granted to a charitable corporation
for the torts of its agents and, in the case of Haynes v. Presby-
terian Hospital Association,2 found that a complete change in the
public policy of that state had occurred from the time when the
immunity had first there been recognized. 3 As a consequence, it
rejected all earlier holdings and proclaimed that immunity, whether
based on the trust fund, the implied waiver, the nonapplicability
of respondeat superior, or the public policy theories, no longer pre-
vailed in that state and the incorporated charity there con-
cerned was ordered to respond "as do private individuals, busi-
ness corporations, and others, when [they do] good in the wrong
way. "4 The fact that the law's emphasis is now generally toward
* LL.B., LL.M., George Washington University School of Law, member of the
bar of Connecticut, District of Columbia and Illinois; LL.B., Chicago-Kent College
of Law, member of Illinois bar, respectively.
1405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
268, 38 Ill. B. J. 581, reversing 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948), noted in
27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 3, 38 Ill. B. J. 187. Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Wilson, J., also dissented.
2- Iowa -, 45 N. W. (2d) 151 (1950). The result therein may have been fore-
cast on the basis of language expressed in Langheim v. Denison Fire Dept. Swimming
Pool, 237 Iowa 386, 21 N. W. (2d) 295 (1946), where the court recognized a growing
tendency to limit or abrogate the doctrine of immunity.
3 Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918).
4 - Iowa -, 45 N. W. (2d) 151 at 154.
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liability for wrongdoing, rather than immunity, was said to re-
quire that result. The forthright character of the opinion in the
Iowa case, together with other recent holdings along the same
line, 5 in contrast to the attitude displayed in Illinois, invites even
further comment on a problem already well discussed.6
Whatever the score may one time have been, a quick look
around the American jurisdictions today reveals that only ten
states still adhere to the doctrine that the charitable corpora-
tion possesses full immunity from tort liability for the acts of
its servants or agents, regardless of the relationship of the in-
jured person to it. 7 Three other states appear to have no deci-
5 The Supreme Court of Vermont, for example, in Foster v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Vermont,-Vt.-, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950), refused to embark on the muddled
sea of charitable immunity when called on to declare the law on the subject for
that state.
6 In addition to notes and comments in CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, Vol. 21,
p. 256: Vol. 24, p. 266; Vol. 26, p. 279, and Vol. 28, p. 268, see also 36 Ill. B. J.
488, 43 II. L. Rev. 248. 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 173, and Feezer, "The Tort Liability
of Charities," 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928), and Zollman, "Damage Liability
of Charitable Institutions," 19 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1921).
7Arkansas Valley Co-op. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. (2d) 538 (1940),
denied recovery to a stranger, while Fordyce v. Woman's Christian National
Library, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155 (1906), reached the same result as to an
employee. In Kansas, the paying patient failed in Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital and
Nurses Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. (2d) 859 (1932), while the stranger
lost in Webb v. Vought, 127 Kan. 799, 275 P. 170 (1916). The presence of insur-
ance has been of no help in Kentucky. See Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193
Ky, 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921), for an employee case, and Pikesville Met. Hospital
v. Donahoo, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753 (1917), as to a paying patient. Cases
from Maryland show no disposition to promote recovery: Howard v. So. Baltimore
Gen'l Hospital,-AMd.-, 62 A. (2d) 574 (1948), as to paying patient; Loeffler v.
Trustees, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917), as to stranger; Perry v. House of Refuge,
63 Md. 20 (1884), as to inmate of charitable institution. But see Flack, Anno.
Code Md. 1947, Art. 48A, §68B, for a statute prohibiting an insurance carrier from
pleading the immunity as a defense. Recovery by a stranger was denied in Ennian
v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930). A servant
lost in Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855 (1906). The beneficiary
failed in MlcDonald v. Mass. Gen'l Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876). Missouri,
despite insurance, still denies recovery: Hinman v. Berkman, 8,5 F. Supp. 2 (1949),
involved a stranger: Steden v. Jewish Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 239 Mo. App. 38, 187
S. W. (2d) 469 (1945), concerned a beneficiary; Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital,
137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189 (1909), an employee. The Oregon case of
Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 4(;4, 153 P. (2d) 837 (1944), in-
dicates the rule of immunity applies alike to stranger and beneficiary. In Sidekumn
v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408. 45 A. (2d) 59 (1946), the stranger failed,
while in Kesmnan v. School Dist., 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. (2d) 17 (1942), a passenger
in a school bus lost despite the presence of insurance. The South Carolina court,
in Caughman v. Colnnbia Y. M. C. A., 212 S. C. 337, 47 S. E. (2d) 788 (1948),
a case involving a paying beneficiary, was impressed with the argument against
immunity but said it was up to the legislature to make the change. See also
Peden v. Furman University, 155 S. C. 1. 151 S. E. 907 (1930). Presence of
insurance did not help in Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. (2d) 212 (1942),
a paying beneficiary case, nor in Waldman v. Y. M. C. A., 227 Wis. 43, 277
N. W. 632 (1938).
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sions at all on the point.' The rest of the states fall into differ-
ing categories, from complete abolition of the immunity in all
cases, on the one extreme, to retention thereof in certain limited
areas on the other. For example, seven states and the District
of Columbia impose unqualified liabilityY Eight states permit
strangers and paying beneficiaries to recover, but presumably
may still retain the immunity in cases involving recipients of
true charity. 10  Fourteen others permit strangers to sue the char-
s The states are Delaware, New Mexico, and South Dakota.
9 See Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463 (1928),
as to a member, and Maki v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 122 Minn. 444, 142 N. W.
705 (1913), for liability to servant. The full respondeat superior doctrine applies
in New Hampshire: Sandwell v. Elliott Hospital, 92 N. H. 41, 24 A. (2d) 273
(1942), an invitee: Welsh v. Frisbie Mem'l Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. (2d)
761 (1939), a paying beneficiary; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73
N. H. 556, 64 A. 190 (1906), a servant. The same thing is true in New York;
Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d) 373 (1941),
paying patient; Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital, 182 App. Div. 10, 169 N. Y. S. 412,
affirmed in 227 N. Y. 665, 126 N. E. 924 (1920), a stranger; Hordern v. Salvation
Army, 199 N. Y. 2,3, 92 N. E. 626 (1910), a servant. The North Dakota case of
Rickbell v. Grafton, 74 N. D. 525, 23 N. W. (2d) 247 (1946), concerned defama-
tion of a stranger to the charity. In Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687,
100 P. (2d) 244 (1940), a servant recovered. The case of Sisters of Sorrowful
Mothers v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. (2d) 996 (1938), involving a paying
patient, is important for the court there said that if exemption is to exist it must
be granted by the legislature. Perhaps the most outstanding decision is that in
Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810 (D. C., 1942),
wherein Rutledge, J., prior to his appointment to the United States Supreme
Court, reviewed all of the cases and theories on the subject. In addition to the
foregoing, the recent decisions in Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, - Iowa
-, 45 N. W. (2d) 151 (1950), and Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont,
- Vt. -, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950), must be considered as placing these two states
in this category.
10 See Baptist Hospital v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1932), a stranger
case, and Tucker v. Mobile Ins. Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915), involving a
paying patient. The California case of Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal.
(2d) 802, 167 P. (2d) 729 (1946), and England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan,
14 Cal. (2d) 791, 97 P. (2d) 813 (1939), permitted a servant and a paying patient,
respectively, to recover but there is dicta that the rule of immunity would be
applied, on the implied waiver theory, as to non-paying beneficiaries. The Florida
view is illustrated by Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So.
344 (1940), actually involving a paying patient but reviewing the entire law of
that state. Although the paying patient may recover in Georgia, provided trust
funds are not disturbed, under Robertson v. Exec. Comm. of Baptist Convention,
55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937), the stranger may recover only if he can
show specific negligence in selecting or retaining incompetent employees: Jackson
v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 425, 167 S. E. 702 (1933). The
Utah rule is illustrated in Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F. (2d)
836 (1941), and in Sessions v. T. Dee Memorial Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d)
645 (1938). Recovery in Colorado, Illinois and Tennessee, together with the
divided view in Georgia, is confined to non-trust assets but extends to both
beneficiaries and strangers: O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado San. Ass'n, 105 Colo.
259, 96 P. (2d) 835 (1939) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950),
and Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947);
Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 187, 213 S. W. (2d) 286 (1949),
a beneficiary case, and Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S. W. (2d) 401
(1943), a stranger.
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itable corporation but withhold permission as to beneficiaries, 1
while eight others, denying liability as to beneficiaries, have not
yet dealt with the problem as it relates to outsiders. 12 In certain
of these states, where recovery is permissible, the action suc-
ceeds only if the charity or its officials can be shown to have
been negligent in the selection or retention of incompetent em-
ployees; in others, the ordinary doctrines relating to respondeat
superior are applied. Few, however, have adopted the view now
made applicable in Illinois, that is one which permits recovery
where non-trust property may be made available to satisfy the
11 Evans v. Lawrence & Mem'l Ass't'd Hospital, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. (2d) 443
(1946); Tocchetti v. Johnson Memorial, 130 Conn. 623, 36 A. (2d) 381 (1944);
Cohen v. Gen'l Hosp. Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931) ; Old
Folks' & Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10
(1930) ; Winona Technical Institute v. Stolte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N. E. 393 (1909);
Andrews v. Y. M. C. A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939), but now modified
by Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, - Iowa -, 45 N. W. (2d) 151 (1950) ;
Lusk v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App., 1941) ; Bougon v. Volunteers of
America, 151 So. 797 (La. App., 1934); DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich.
339, 10 N. W. (2d) 907 (1943) ; Greatrix v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 261 Mich.
327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933); Gallon v. House of Good Shepherd, 158 Mich. 361,
122 N. W. 631 (1909) ; Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W.
951 (1907); Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp. Ass'n, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208
(1918); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium Ben. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W.
1120 (1912) ; Fair v. Atlantic City Hospital, 50 A. (2d) 376 (N.J. Cir., 1946);
Fields v. Mountain Side Hosp., 35 A. (2d) 701 (N.J. Cir., 1944); D'Amato v.
Orange Mem'l Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 A. 340 (1925); Herndon v. Massey,
217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940) ; Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Ass'n, 197 N. C.
41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929); Hoke v. Glen, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914);
Pearlstein v. A. M. McGregor Home, 79 Ohio App. 526, 73 N. E. (2d) 106 (1947) ;
Kovar v. Lakeside Hospital, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. (2d) 857 (1936) ; Sisters of
Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930) ; Basabo v. Salvation
Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 A. 120 (1912) ; Medical & Surgical Mem. Hosp. v. Cauthorn,
229 S. W. (2d) 932 (Tex. Civ. App., 1950); Southern Methodist University v.
Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S. W. (2d) 749 (1944); Armendorez v. Hotel Dieu,
210 S. W. 518 (Tex. Comm'n App., 1919) ; Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Vermont, - Vt. -, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950), but see federal district court applica-
tions of its concept of Vermont law in Ellsworth v. Brattelboro Retreat, 68 F.
Supp. 706 (1946), and in Putnam Memorial Hospital v. Allen, 34 F. (2d) 927
(1929); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785
(1921); Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914);
Kalinowski v. Y. W. C. A., 17 Wash. (2d) 380, 135 P. (2d) 852 (1943); Miller
v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. (2d) 204, 105 P. (2d) 32 (1940); Susman v.
Y. M. C. A., 101 Wash. 487, 172 P. 554 (1918); Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital,
99 Wash. 399, 169 P. 828 (1918).
12 Southern Methodist Hospital, etc. v. Wilson. 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P. (2d) 458 (1948)
Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints, 59 Ida. 350, 82 P. (2d) 849 (1938)
Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Inf., 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898 (1910); Miss. Int'l Or-
der of Twelve v. Barnes, 204 Miss. 333, 37 So. (2d) 487 (1948); Mississippi Bap-
tist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930) ; Borgeas v. Oregon Short
Line R. R. Co., 73 Mont. 407, 236 P. 1069 (1925) ; Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372,
277 P. 798 (1929); Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.-g.
318 (1925) ; Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 P. 385 (1916).
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claims of the injured person but denies recourse against the trust
funds.
In achieving that result, the majority of the Illinois Supreme
Court took the position that, no matter what the interpretations
might have been over the years, the holding in Parks v. North-
western University1" did no more than "exempt the trust funds
of a charity from any liability for the torts of its agents and em-
ployees.' 1 4 It did not, and it is now claimed it was never in-
tended, to "impose a disability to be sued in tort," for the im-
munity was said to be one which might be waived, particularly
if not aggressively asserted,'5 even to the point where trust assets
as well might be depleted.
The clarification, if it may be called such, provided by the
decision in the Moore case, now opens the door to the considera-
tion of other problems, for at least four new and major questions
will have to be decided. In the first place, since there is to be no
absolute immunity against the bringing of suit, the plaintiff will
have to determine whether the complaint should, or should not,
contain necessary allegation with reference to the existence of
non-trust property from which satisfaction could be obtained in
order to be able to state an actionable case. Secondly, if such
allegation is or is not necessary, the plaintiff may or may not
be faced with the requirement of proof thereof, in case denial
be entered, at the time he attempts to establish his prima facie
case of wrong and injury. If the issue is a pertinent one, but
not pertinent at that time, the element of proof may become im-
portant when related proceedings, such as garnishment, credi-
tor's bill or the like, are brought to enforce the judgment. The
third problem, parcel of the first two, involves a question as to
whether or not it will be the responsibility of the charitable en-
terprise, rather than the plaintiff, to plead and prove not only
13 218 Il1. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556 (1905).
14405 Ill. 555 at 560, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 at 84.
15 In Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 309 Ill. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923), the
corporation failed to respond to a summons served on one of its employees and
suffered a default judgment. Its attempt to secure relief from such judgment was
denied because of its culpable failure to assert the defense of immunity.
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the nature of the organization but also that its assets consist
solely of trust funds so as to prevent either the rendition or the
satisfaction of a judgment. In that connection, the unwilling-
ness of Illinois courts to permit mention of such things as in-
surance in the presence of a jury16 and the indifference of the
Illinois legislature with respect to permitting direct suit against,
or joinder of, the insurance carrier will bring about the formula-
tion of subsidiary problems. Perhaps the most important area
in which conflict can arise, however, will be in the field of spell-
ing out the difference or distinction which supposedly exists be-
tween trust and non-trust funds.
Answers to the first two issues may have been provided by the
language of the majority opinion in the Moore case. The court
said:
It is argued that this would give rise to a situation which
would create liability only in the event the charitable insti-
tutions were insured, and it is suggested that liability is predi-
cated upon the absence or presence of liability insurance.
It is apparent that such is not the case, due to the fact that
the question of insurance in no way affects the liability of
the institution, but would only go to the question of the
manner of collecting any judgment which might be obtained,
without interfering with, or subjecting the trust funds or
trust-held property to, the judgment. The question as to
whether or not the institution is insured in no way affects
its liability any more than whether a charitable institution
holding private nontrust property or funds would affect its
liability. These 'questions would only be of importance at
the proper time when the question arose as to the collection
of any judgment out of nontrust property or assets.17
It would seem to follow, therefore, that it is not necessary for
the plaintiff to allege or prove that the defendant corporation has
16 Kavanaugh v. Parrett, 379 Il. 273, 40 N. E. (2d) 500 (1942), noted in 20
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 371; Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d)
499 (1938), noted in 16 CHICAGo-KE NT LAW REvIEw 371; Mithen v. Jeffery, 259 Ill.
372, 102 N. E. 778 (1913).
17 Moore v. Moyle, 405 i1. 555 at 564-5, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 at 86.
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non-trust funds from which satisfaction may be obtained, but that
his complaint would follow along ordinary lines. That conclu-
sion, at least, is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court
of Tennessee in Anderson v. Armstrong,' a case referred to by
the Illinois Supreme Court with some degree of approval, and
conforms to the rule that the plaintiff should not, in his complaint
in a law action, anticipate or seek to overcome an expected
defense. 19
It cannot be said, however, that there is clear precedent in
Illinois on the subject for different approaches were made in the
two Illinois cases in which any degree of success has been at-
tained to date. The case of Wendt v. Servite Fathers20 was
modelled along the line suggested, for the complaint therein was
an ordinary negligence complaint with no specific reference to
the charitable nature of the defendant corporation or to the pres-
ence of insurance. After defendant interposed the defense of
immunity by way of answer, the plaintiff then filed a reply as-
serting the presence of liability insurance and waiving all right
to a judgment for any sum larger than the policy proceeds so
as not to endanger any trust property. In direct contrast, the
complaint in Moore v. Moyle2' not only contained the usual tort
allegations but, recognizing the character of the corporate de-
fendant, alleged the institution was fully insured as well as owned
other non-trust property so that a judgment could be satisfied
without exposing trust funds to possible impairment. The whole
issue being revealed in the complaint, the case was ripe for the
use of a motion to dismiss on the ground of a failure to state a
cause of action. In passing on the ruling predicated on that mo-
tion, the Supreme Court expressed no comment as to the pro-
priety of the course of pleading, confining its remarks to the funda-
mental issue of whether or not liability could exist.
The method of pleading utilized in the Moore case was the
18 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S. W. (2d) 401 (1903).
19 Gunton v. Hughes, 181 Il1. 132, 54 N. E. 895 (1899).
20332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvmw 279.
21405 Il. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950).
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same as that which had been followed in the earlier Appellate
Court case of Myers v. Young Men's Christian Association of
Quincy 22 wherein the court concluded the complaint had been
properly stricken because the allegation of insurance coverage
would call to the attention of the jury an element of fact they
were not entitled to learn as well as because no actionable cause
existed against the charity. That rationale was criticised in later
cases, even where recovery on the fundamental issue was denied,
on the ground that the cases which condemned attempts to con-
vey improper information to the jury were cases in which the
effort had been made during the selection or impanelling of the
jury or in the course of the trial. 23
In that regard, the court deciding the case of Piper v. Ep-
stein 4 stated:
In none of the cases was the question of insurance an issue
affecting the right of plaintiff to recover or the liability of
the defendant. It was an irrelevant matter prejudicing the
defendant. If carrying insurance by a charitable institution
creates a liability not otherwise existing, the fact that such
insurance was carried and the nature and terms of the policy
become material issues, and evidence relating thereto, al-
though prejudicial to the defendant, is competent. 25
Either form of allegation, therefore, would seem permissible but
preference is expressed, in the interest of clarity of pleading, to
the first method.
The second question, one intimately connected with the bur-
den of proof, would seem to be answered in much the same form,
for the plaintiff should not, at least in the primary personal in-
jury or contract suit against the charity, be obliged to prove any
more than what he is forced to allege. In that way, at least from
the plaintiff's standpoint, there will be no fear that forbidden in-
22316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942), criticised in 21 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw REVIEW 256.
23 See cases cited in note 16, ante.
24326 ll. App. 400,' 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945), criticised in 24 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw REVIEw 266.
25326 I1. App. 400 at 406, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 at 142.
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formation respecting the defendant's ability to satisfy a judg-
ment, or of the presence of insurance, will reach the ears of the
jury and infect their verdict with prejudice. 26  The materiality of
proof of the existence of insurance or non-trust funds could well
be held in abeyance until attempt is made to enforce the judg-
ment, should one be obtained. There is ample room, in a garnish-
ment proceeding, 27 a creditor's bill, or a proceeding for trial of
the right of property2 to thrash out all questions concerning the
right to secure satisfaction from the particular source against
which seizure is directed.2 9
The answer to the third question, one which concerns itself
with the duty of the charitable corporation to interpose the de-
fense of immunity, would seem to be answered not only by the
logic of the foregoing but by pleading requirements concerning
the setting forth of affirmative defenses. 30 Bearing in mind the
rationale of the Moore case, to-wit: an immunity is one of de-
fensive character only, if it exists at all, it could well be said that
a charitable corporation should not be entitled to the advantage
thereof unless it sees fit to present the same in an appropriate
fashion.31 The Supreme Court's revised ideas relating to the
Parks holding would tend to confirm this view, for it said the
Parks case "seems to have provided a defense only" and did not
destroy the right of action. Following through with that line of
argument, the charitable corporation which sees fit, by affirmative
defense, to spread before the court the fact that it carries in-
surance or other forms of indemnity, particularly in order to limit
26 That possibility appears to have influenced the outcome of the case of Myers
v. Young Men's Christian Association of Quincy, 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d)
755 (1942). If the complaint containing an allegation of insurance coverage Is
read to the jury as the basis of an opening argument, a violation of the rule
laid down in Mithen v. Jeffery, 259 Ill. 372, 102 N. E. 778 (1913), might well occur
from oversight. It could not happen if no statement as to the presence of Insur-
ance appears in the complaint.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 1 et seq.
28 Ibid., Ch. 77, § 70 et seq.
29 At that time, the plaintiff's demand has been established by the judgment and
prejudicial error is unlikely to occur from any reference to insurance.
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4), directs that "any ground or de-
fense, whether affirmative or not, which if not expressly stated would be likely to
take the opposite party by surprise" must be plainly set forth in the answer.
31 Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 309 Ill. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the judgment to the extent of policy coverage, could hardly com-
plain that such fact has thereby become known. The skilful trial
judge and alert counsel will still see to it that no improper use
is made of such information.
The fourth question, one having to do with the difference be-
tween trust and non-trust funds, is the one on which there is
little guide provided by the Illinois law. The opinion in the Moore
case lays down no definite rules other than to note that recourse
against the proceeds of an insurance policy would seemingly pro-
duce no impairment or depletion of the trust fund. Cases in other
jurisdictions have taken up the issue. In Louisiana, for example,
where direct suit against the insurer is permitted by statute, it
has been held that an injured licensee may reach the policy pro-
ceeds,32 and much the same result appears to have been obtained
in Arkansas where the trust fund theory of immunity has been
accepted.33 The proposition has been urged in other states which
also, to some extent, accept the trust fund theory, however the
decision in the Tennessee case of Vanderbilt University v. Hender-
son 34 flatly asserts that "such insurance is not trust property and
may be appropriated to the satisfaction of such judgment." 35
Nisi prius decisions in Illinois, prior to the holding in the Moore
case, have been to that effect36 and at least one Appellate Court
opinion turns on the same view. 37
32 Lusk v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App., 1941).
33 Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (1950). It was
there argued that Ark. Stat. Anno. 1947, § 66.517, which permits direct suit against
the insurer where "any co-operative non-profit corporation, association or organi-
zation . . . [is] not subject to suit for tort," did not apply because the hospital
in question was open to suit. The court held otherwise.
3423 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
'5 See also O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado San. Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d)
835 (1939).
36 A memorandum opinion of Judge Frankhauser, in Shaleen v. Newberry Library,
Case No. 39-S-11479, Superior Court of Cook County, noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviFw 8. rejected the claim of immunity where an insurance policy was in exist-
ence on the ground that "when the fund is not jeopardized and cannot be reached to
satisfy a judgment against the institution, the question of non-liability manifestly
disappears." See also the decision of Judge Fisher in Well Cartage Co. v. Sisters
of the Holy Family of Nazareth, Case No. 38-C-3374, Circuit Court of Cook County,
noted in 20 Chicago Bar Rec. 141 (1939), and that of Judge Fulton, prior to his
elevation to the Illinois Supreme Court, in McCuiston v. Hinsdale Hospital and
Sanatarium, Circuit Court of DuPage County.
37 Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), noted in
26 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REWIEW 279, 36 Ill. B. J. 488, 43 I1. L. Rev. 248.
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There is every reason in the world for holding that insur-
ance protection, if present, should not be denied to the injured
person, but it does not follow that other non-trust assets are not
also within reach. In the absence of insurance, the existence of
property of that character would be vital. Few cases exist on
that point, but two holdings, one from Georgia and one from Ten-
nessee, may help throw light on the subject. In the Georgia case
of Morton v. Savannah Hospital"8 it was said that if a hospital
receives, or has due to it, money from paying patients such money
does not constitute a trust fund. The Tennessee case of Hammond
Post v. Willis39 would subject all general operating funds to
execution.
Dictum in the Moore case would indicate a purpose to class
"all" non-trust assets as a source from which satisfaction might
be obtained, so it is likely that only those funds or property held
under a strict trust, sometime referred to as fixed endowment, will
be given the benefit of exemption.40 To treat all property or money
in the hands of the charitable corporation as impressed with a
trust for the effective carrying out of the corporate purpose, sim-
ply because the same rests in corporate hands, would nullify the
steps already taken to abrogate the immunity doctrine. As re-
treat is not likely to occur, the court will be pressed to settle these
questions as they arise. The pressure may result in a total de-
struction of the dike of immunity. If that is not what charitable
corporations want, they would be wise to secure adequate liability
insurance coverage to satisfy all reasonable claims and prevent
the necessity for further interpretations of the law. Not only
will a good public relations policy be subserved thereby but risk
of a complete obliteration of the immunity will be obviated.
It should not be assumed that the mere presence of insur-
ance will answer all problems. After insurance coverage has been
3s 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918).
39 179 Tenn. 226, 165 S. W. (2d) 78 (1942).
40 In that regard, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 49, as to the right to
reach assets held in trust to secure satisfaction of a judgment pronounced against
a beneficiary when the trust fund was furnished or created, in good faith, by some
one other than the beneficiary.
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obtained still other areas may be left open for dispute, particu-
larly if insurance contracts issued hereafter follow along the line
of those which have been used in the past. The case of Kos v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago4' would indicate that certain char-
itable corporations have accepted, or insisted upon, policies con-
taining a clause to the effect that the insurance company is not
to use, either in the adjustment of claims or in defense of suit,
any claim of immunity unless requested so to do by the insured
charitable corporation. If no such request is made, the injured
party, as third-party beneficiary or garnisheeing creditor, could
readily obtain advantage from the policy coverage. What, how-
ever, should be the result if the charity were to demand assertion
of the defense of immunity in its behalf and if no other non-trust
funds existed from which satisfaction could be obtained? Some
court would, undoubtedly, be obliged to decide whether such a
clause was valid or whether it would be improper to allow the
question of liability or no liability to rest in the hands of the de-
fendant, to be suffered or not as it wished. Granted that no char-
itable corporation is required to provide true financial responsi-
bility, still should it not, if it insures at all, be required to secure
complete as well as adequate coverage?
Suppose, further, that the case has progressed successfully
to the point of a verdict favoring the plaintiff and all post-trial
motions have failed to disturb the finding. What, now, of the
judgment that should be entered? If that judgment is pronounced
without qualification as to the manner of its enforcement, how is
the charitable corporation to act in order to protect its trust
assets? No statute provides it with the right to claim an exemp-
tion, as is true in the case of homestead, unless it may have the
benefit of the provisions of the Chancery Act.4 2 No sheriff would
know whether the execution he receives is, in any way, limited. It
41317 Iii. App. 248, 45 N. E. (2d) 1006 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEW 258.
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 49. But see Young v. Handwerk, 179 F.
(2d) 70 (1949), noted in 1950 Ill. L. Forum 269, as to the effect of bankruptcy on
the interest of a beneficiary under a trust otherwise protected by the provision afore-
mentioned. There is a possibility that the same rule could be applied to the
charitable corporation which became bankrupt.
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is likely, therefore, that recourse to further proceedings, possibly
in equity to enjoin the levy and sale, would become necessary, en-
tailing further dispute as to whether immunity existed at all.
What if the judgment were expressly limited so as to permit re-
covery out of the non-trust assets alone, in much the same way
as a judgment against an administrator or executor is limited to
payment from the assets of the estate? Is it to be the duty of the
trial court, as part of the hearing on the primary issue, to ascer-
tain whether any non-trust assets exist and, if so, compile a de-
tailed record thereof for the guidance of its officers? Or must
other, and separate proceedings, be entertained for that purpose?
43
The Moore case provides no answer to these questions, nor can
one be found readily in the law.
Nor can it be assumed that what has been said covers all
issues or settles all questions implicit in the holding in the Moore
case, for other disputed points might well arise. Enough has been
said, however, to show that the Illinois law is still in a definite
state of flux, with thorny problems likely to face the Illinois Su-
preme Court in the future. That court may yet come to the belief
that it would have been wiser if it had, as the dissenting judge
suggested,44 examined again into the reasons and justifications
said to support the doctrine of immunity. Had it done so, and,
upon examining, found those reasons to be inadequate, it would
have done much to remove areas of confusion which still mark the
law of Illinois.
43 Citation procedure is now available under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 259.26A.
44 The dissenting opinion of Crampton, J., in Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555 at 567-8,
92 N. E. (2d) 81 at 87-8, states: ". .. the primary issue of immunity should be
frankly faced ... The fact that this Court has in the past adhered to the doctrine
of immunity is highly persuasive. But it is not conclusive . . . I think the crucial
policy of exempting charitable institutions from tort liability is of sufficient gravity
to require a further appraisal ... The issue here presented should be resolved upon
the merit of those reasons rather than upon the adoption of criteria which merely
purport to extend or modify the doctrine and which I believe can result in little
but confusion in the law."
WAREHOUSE REGULATION SINCE MUNN v. ILLINOIS
J. R. Blomquist*
O VER EIGHTY YEARS ago, midwestern farmers were driven
into organized revolt against their almost complete depend-
ence upon outside markets for the disposal of their produce
and upon corporately owned elevators and railroads for its han-
dling. Rates as high as fifty-eight and one-half cents per bushel
for the shipping of grain from the Mississippi basin to the At-
lantic seaboard, and nearly half as much for the short haul from
an Iowa farm to Chicago, brought about rumblings which were
heard in the midwestern legislative halls in 1869 as well as in
the Illinois Constitutional Convention held during that same
period. Those farmers who had bound themselves together in a
lodge known as the Patrons of Husbandry, and a host of un-
affiliated farmers' clubs, asserted new-found political power while
they exhorted their neighbors to elect only those who shared in
the view that nothing less than state regulation of railroads and
elevators could rid them of the stifling practices of those enter-
prises.1
The success of the Granger Movement was first felt by the
warehouse operators when the framers of the Illinois Constitution
of 1870 embraced the cause of the grain shippers and inserted in
that document a provision denoting grain elevators and store-
houses as public warehouses, and directing the General Assem.
bly to pass laws for the protection of producers, shippers, and re-
ceivers of grain.2 In the following year, a comprehensive body
* A. B., LL. B. Member, Illinois bar. Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
1 See Buck, The Granger Movement (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1933,
being a reprint of the 1913 edition).
2 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XIV. The Illinois Supreme Court, In Hannah v. People,
198 Ill. 77 at 82, 64 N. E. 776 at 777 (1902), adverted to the fact that "the framers
of the Constitution deemed the matter of protection of producers and shippers of
grain against wrong, fraud, and imposition on the part of those engaged in the
business of providing storage for grain of great importance is demonstrated .by the
fact that they devoted an entire article of the Constitution to that subject." That
the framers included such material at all would seem sufficient evidence of the
importance they attached to the matter, inasmuch as no other state constitution
touches on the subject of warehousing.
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of regulation was enacted by the Illinois legislature pursuant to
this directive.3 Maximum rates for grain storage were established
and operators of public warehouses were required to obtain
licenses and to post bonds. Believing they were engaged in a
private business not subject to such regulation, two Chicago ele-
vator operators continued to charge the same storage rates as
they had previously done, rates which were in excess of the new
maximum imposed by the statute. The Supreme Court of the
United States was thereby led to decide the case of Munn v. Illi-
nois4 and to make its first significant pronouncement on the public
utility concept.
That the pricing practices of grain storage companies to-
gether with the concentrated control of the business in Chicago
influenced the court to uphold the Illinois enactment cannot be
doubted. Warehouses, the court said, stood "at the very gate-
way of commerce to take toll from all who passed," 5 for which
reason anyone who devoted his property to such a use in effect
granted "to the public an interest in that use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good."', Oddly
enough, these familiar words taken from the opinion in Munn v.
Illinois, although spoken with reference to the operation of grain
warehouses, have rarely been mentioned since in relation to that
activity. Based on an almost forgotten work written two centuries
earlier by Chief Justice Hale,7 the doctrine of property affected
with a public interest had never been applied to a statute like
this one, but the words became a formula. Warehouses, however,
were forgotten except insofar as the warehousing activity had
been the incidental vehicle for an important decision. Regulation
of warehouses by state legislatures, though, was to continue and
to be expanded on all sides for seventy years.
The words of the Supreme Court relating to the suscepti-
3 Ill. Laws 1871-2, p. 762, Act of April 25, 1871. The statute presently appears in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, §§ 189-214.
4 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
5 94 U. S. 113 at 132, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 86.
6 94 U. S. 113 at 126, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 84.
7 De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr. 78.
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bility of warehouses to governmental control have proved sur-
prisingly durable in the seventy-three years since they were
spoken. Few voices have risen to challenge the wisdom of Jus-
tice Waite in the interim, despite a lusty prediction at the time
that Munn v. Illinois would toll the death knell for unregulated
individual enterprise in the United States." It is, therefore, not
surprising that the next important occasion on which warehouse
regulation was brought into focus by the Supreme Court resulted
from another conflict based upon other constitutional considera-
tions. Accepting the premise that they must submit to regulation,
the warehouse operators turned their attention to the matter of
identifying the tormenter, realizing that they might gain if they
were free to ignore oppressive state regulation while complying
with federal enactments on the subject.
Although warehouse acts were conceived by state legislatures,
the court deciding Munm, v. Illinois had not ignored the relation of
elevators to interstate commerce. Indeed, it recognized the pos-
sibility that Congress might institute a system of controls when
it said:
The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and
their businesses carried on exclusively in Illinois. They are
used as instruments by those engaged in State as well as those
engaged in interstate commerce, but they are not more neces-
sarily a part of commerce itself than the dray or the car by
which, but for them, grain would not be transferred from
one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may be-
come connected with interstate commerce, but not necessarily
so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and cer-
tainly, until Congress acts in reference to their interstate
relations, the State may exercise all the powers of govern-
ment over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly
operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. 9
SThe august New York Times called the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois "mis-
chievous," "meddlesome," and "vexatious." See Clemens, Economics and Public
Utilities (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1950), p. 16.
9 94 U. S. 113 at 135, 24 L. Ed. 77 at 87.
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But Congress, apparently, was not then ready to take up the sub-
ject of regulating interstate commerce, not at least so far as reg-
ulating grain warehousing was concerned.
With the impetus provided by the decision in Muwn v. Illinois,
the states got down to serious business. Many of the midwestern
and northwestern states, where the Granger Movement had flour-
ished and where the abuses by elevator operators had been felt
most acutely, adopted legislation patterned, in varying degree,
on the Illinois Warehouse Act.10 By 1914, some fifteen states re-
quired a license for all who engaged in the activities of a public
grain warehouse." Seven states allowed the fixing of rates for
the storage of grain,12 and others applied like regulation to the
storage of cotton and tobacco. 13  Six states fixed maximum stor-
age rates.'4 In addition to the matters mentioned, many statutes
included provisions relating to inspection, weighing, rendering
reports, grading, discrimination, and the like. 15  Those states
which passed up the opportunity to enact such statutes were, by
and large, those which had no extensive grain elevator business
within their bounds.
The jurisdiction of states to exercise police powers in this
fashion remained unchallenged by Congress for many years and,
seemingly, all were content to leave the matter in the hands of
10 See Mohun, Warehousemen (Nickerson & Collins Co., Chicago, 1914).
11Ala. Code 1907, § 6124; Ida. Rev. Code 1908, § 1482d; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1916, Ch.
114, § 136; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3346; Ky. Stat. 1909, § 4782; Mass. Rev. Laws
1902, Ch. 69, § 1; Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, § 2048; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1909, § 11947;
Mont. Laws 1913, Ch. 47, § 19; N. D. Laws 1913, Ch. 239, p. 383; Okla. Rev. Laws
1910, § 8248: Ore. Laws 1910, § 6043; S. D. Rev. Code 1903, § 484; Pierce's Wash.
Code 1912, Tit. 211, § 18; Wis. Stat. 1911, § 1747-1.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1912, Ch. 114, § 147: Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3360; Mo. Laws
1913, p. 354, § 27; N. Y. Cons. Laws 1909, Vol. 2, Gen. Bus. Law, Ch. 20, Art. 26,
§ 396; N. D. Rev. Code 1905, § 2252; Okla. Rev. Laws 1910, § 8266; Wis. Stat. 1911,
§ 1747-18.
15 The South Carolina Code 1912, § 2332, dealt with cotton. Ohio Gen. Code 1910,
§ 6058; Tenn. Acts 1909, § 3399; and Pollard Va. Code 1904, § 1821, regulated tobacco
storage.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1912, Ch. 114, § 147; Minn. Rev. Laws 1909, § 2057; Mo. Laws
1913, p. 354, § 27; Mont. Laws 1913, § 33; N. Y. Cons. Laws 1909, Vol. 2, Gen. Bus.
Law, Ch. 20, Art. 26, § 396; Okla. Rev. Laws 1910, § 8266.
15 The statutes referred to in notes 11 to 14 inclusive are those which achieve
regulation relating specifically to warehouses. Other statutes, where regulation may
be accomplished under powers granted over public utilities generally, are not
Included in the tabulation.
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state agencies for the evils sought to be curbed were felt mostly
at the local level. However, no one questioned the power of Con-
gress to act with reference to the interstate relations of the ware-
housing business'1 and, in 1916, with the enactment of the United
States Warehouse Act, 17 Congress asserted that power. That
statute authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to license grain
warehouse operators, to investigate weighing procedures, to in-
spect elevators, to require bonds of licensees, to prohibit discrimi-
nation, to require standardized reports of licensees, and to impose
other miscellaneous restrictions on the freedom of operators.
Three features of this action were significant. In the first
place, the act did not require a license of any operator whose op-
erations affected interstate commerce, but only permitted the
licensing of those operators interested enough to make application
for the same and who were willing to comply with the act and the
regulations imposed thereunder.' Secondly, as originally en-
acted, the statute set the record straight with regard to the status
of existing state laws by declaring that nothing "in this Chapter
shall be construed to conflict with or to authorize any conflict
with, or in any way impair the effect of operations of the laws of
any state relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, grad-
ers, or classifiers. "'9 Thus it is apparent that state regulation of
warehouses had become so important a part of the economic and
political fabric that Congress was especially careful not to up-
root the extensive network of state controls which had been ef-
fectively established following the decision in the Munn case. A
third factor, useful in evaluating the United States Warehouse
Act, is to be found in the purpose of the legislation, for that pur-
16 In U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 at 118, 61 S. Ct. 451 at 459, 85 L. Ed. 609 at
619 (1940), the court declared that "power of Congress over interstate commerce
is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them an appropriate means to the attain-
ment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted powers of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce."
17 39 Stat. 486, Ch. 313, part C, as amended: 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 et seq., 2 Fed.
Code Anno., Tit. 7, § 241 et seq.
'8 7 U. S. C. A. § 244.
19 Ibid., § 269.
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pose appeared to be one to provide a glorified warehouse re-
ceipts law, written with the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act in
mind. It was designed to enhance the value of grain and similar
receipts for collateral purposes by assuring bankers and credit
men that grain which had been stored in a federally licensed ware-
house would be subject to added controls planned for their
protection.20  It would seem clear, as has been stated, that Con-
gress did not undertake any general affirmative regulation of ware-
houses even remotely comparable to the scope of regulation it
has provided for other public utilities.
Co-existing state and federal control seemed to be sanctioned
both by the United States Warehouse Act and by federal court
decisions for a considerable period of time following 1916. It
was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in Independent Gin
& Warehouse Company v. Dunwoody, 2 1 that Congress did not
intend to occupy the whole field of law in relation to the storage
of agricultural products moving in interstate commerce, so as to
exclude the jurisdiction of the states, even though such regula-
tion should tend to affect interstate commerce, for an Alabama
statute which required a license of a cotton warehouseman was
there upheld. The Supreme Court itself stated that the purpose
of the federal act was not to supersede state law but was in-
tended to provide a form of co-operation with state officials in the
control of the activity.22 In a few years, therefore, twenty-one
states had laws requiring licenses of all public warehousemen, 23
and five others had laws with exacted similar compliance from
20 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 at 242, 67 S. Ct. 1146 at 1158, 91 L. Ed. 1447 at 1465
(1946).
2140 F. (2d) 1 (1930).
22 See Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365, 39 S. Ct. 114, 63 L. Ed. 300
(1919).
23 Ida. Code 1947, Tit. 69, § 2; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, §§ 189-214;
Burn's Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, Tit. 67, Ch. 5; Kan. Gen. Stat. Anno. 1935, Ch. 34,
Art. 2; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, Ch. 359; La. Gen. Stat. 1935, Tit. 68, Ch. 1; Mass.
Anno. Laws, 1948 Supp., Ch. 105; Mich. Stat. Anno., 1949 Supp., §§ 12.119(1)-
12.119(22) ; Minn. Stat. 1949, Ch. 231, 232 and 233; Mo. Rev. Stat. Anno., Ch. 141;
Mont. Rev. Code Anno. 1947, § 3-201 to § 3-232; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 88-201 to§ 88-215; N. H. Rev. Laws, 1942, Ch. 205; N. Al. Stat. Anno. 1941, § 53-901 to § 53-911;
N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Tit. 60; Okla. Stat. Anno. 1938, Tit. 81; Ore. Comp. Laws
Anno. 1940, § 60-101 to § 60-113; S. D. Code 1939, Ch. 60.03; S. C. Code 1942, § 7176;
Wash. Rev. Stat. Anno. 1933, Tit. 83; Wis. Stat. 1949, Ch. 126.
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operators of cotton, tobacco, or cold storage warehouses. 2 In
four additional states, warehousemen could obtain a license if
they wished to do so. 2 5 The number of states controlling storage
rates under warehouse acts had increased to eleven, 26 while a
number of others exercised the same regulation under powers
granted over public utilities generally. Some state statutes con-
tained clauses exempting operators from state regulation if they
had secured a license under the federal Warehouse Act.27  But
the complexity of state enactments ranged from extensive regu-
lation of all phases of the pursuit, on the one hand,2 8 to toothless
acts having to do with little more than fire prevention on the other.
Such diversity in types of control could lead to but one result.
Once more the cry was heard that credit transactions were being
endangered by such a state of affairs. Bankers admitted that
they were unable to keep pace with the laws of forty-eight states,
hence were unable properly to estimate the security value of the
warehouse receipts with which they dealt.2 9  At their insistence,
in 1931, Section 269 of the United States Warehouse Act was
amended and language was used which made it unmistakable that
the intent of Congress was to substitute the federal system for
those which had been developed under the various state statutes 0
It is difficult to estimate with what degree of enthusiasm state
agencies enforced their local controls after the amendment of
24 Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, § 52-903, applies to cotton and wool storage; Ark. Stat.
Anno. 1947, Tit. 77, Ch. 13, deals with co-operatives; Page's Ohio Gen. Code 1945,
§ 6043, and Tenn. Code Anno. 1942, §§ 6477-8, cover tobacco warehousing; while Va.
Code Anno. 1950, Tit. 61-80, regulates cold storage.
25 Deering Cal. Code Anno. 1950, Agriculture, Div. 6, Oh. 5: Ga. Code Anno. 1937.
Tit. 111; Iowa Code Anno. 1949, Ch. 543; N. C. Gen. Stat. 1950, § 66-35
26 To the statutes mentioned in note 14, ante, there should be added statutes
enacted in Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, an(d
Wisconsin. Citations thereto appear in notes 23 and 24, ante.
27 See, for example, the statutes of Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico. and
Oklahoma referred to in notes 23 and 24, ante.
28 Examples of comprehensive regulation may be found in the Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota statutes cited in note 23, ante.
29 See Sen. Rep. No. 1775, 71st Cong., 3d sess., p. 2; H. R. Rep. No. 4, 71st Cong.,
1st sess., and 72 Cong. Rec. 8529.
30 46 Stat. 1465, 7 U. S. C. A. § 269, omitted the clause quoted in the text at
footnote 19, ante, and added "but the power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred
upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this Chapter shall be exclusive with respect
to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as said license is in effect."
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Section 269. Some indication is to be found, in the few reported
cases decided since then, that warehouse operators ignored state
regulations when they chose to obtain a federal license. One
Illinois company, for example, owning twenty of the forty-one
elevators in Chicago and storing approximately 35,000,000 bushels
out of the total capacity of 47,757,000 bushels, licensed twelve of
its warehouses under the federal act but only three under the
Illinois statute, the remaining five not being public warehousesA1
The Supreme Court of South Dakota seemed to feel that state
control had been displaced entirely by the federal act which
granted discretionary power to the Secretary of Agriculture to
exercise exclusive federal control without co-operation with the
states. 3 2 When a defendant failed to secure a state license, but
did possess a federal one, the South Dakota court met the head-on
collision by holding that the state must bow out and defer to the
United States Warehouse Act. 3
It might be said to be appropriate, or ironic, that the show-
down in the argument of state in contrast to federal regulation
of grain warehouses should have its situs in the same state, and
concern substantially the same warehouse act, which had been in-
volved in Munn v. Illinois. The Granger Movement had long since
been forgotten, but the threat of oppressive practices by unregu-
lated, or inadequately regulated, terminal grain elevator opera-
tors must have been in the mind of the petitioner, an owner,
dealer, and shipper of grain, when, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corporation,3 4 he charged the elevator corporation with maintain-
31 Edward R. Bacon Grain Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 Ill. App. 245, 59 N. E. (2d)
689 (1945).
32 In re Farmers Co-op Ass'n, 69 S. D. 191, 8 N. W. (2d) 557 (1943).
3369 S. D. 191 at 199, 8 N. W. (2d) 557 at 561. The court held that it was
necessary to look to the impact, on the national economy, of the country elevator
business as a whole in determining whether its effect on interstate commerce was
substantial. The fact that the particular co-operative elevator's own effect was
trivial was not enough to remove it from the rule since the contribution of the
entire industry would be great. This theory was discussed in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1922). See also Federal Compress Co.
v. McClean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 S. Ct. 267, 78 L. Ed. 622 (1933), a case holding that a
non-discriminatory state tax on warehouses was not prohibited by the United States
Warehouse Act since that statute had not assumed to tax the business nor had
exercised any control over state taxation.
34331 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1946), affirming 156 F. (2d) 33
(1946), in part. Frankfurter, J., with whom Rutledge, J., concurred, wrote a dis-
senting opinion.
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ing excessive rates, engaging in discriminatory practices, operat-
ing without a state license, rendering inadequate service, mixing
public grain of different grades, as well as perpetrating other
violations of the Illinois Warehouse Act. The corporation sought
to enjoin further proceedings on the basis that the right of the
State of Illinois to enforce its regulations had been superseded
by the federal act. The Supreme Court of the United States, on
certiorari, affirmed the warehouseman's position and granted the
injunction, with the result that the shipper was unable to have his
remedy for the alleged violations of the state law.
By that decision, state regulation has now been foreclosed
where the warehouseman has elected to obtain a federal license,
at least as to those matters which are "in any way regulated by
the federal act," and dual regulation has been eliminated. For
those operators who do not choose to secure a federal license,
and in those aspects of warehousing which the federal act does
not "touch," however meagerly and indirectly, state law may con-
tinue in force. However, the areas so retained for control by the
states appear to be of negligible importance.
In the Rice case, for example, nine aspects of regulation by
both agencies were compared. Under the Illinois statute, public
utility rates must be just and reasonable and the state commission
may fix rates which meet that standard, 5 and maximum storage
charges are set by statute .3  The federal act, in contrast, per-
mits the revocation or suspension of a license if it appears that
rates are "unreasonable or exorbitant," but does not permit of
rate-fixing nor provide adequate sanction against the charging of
excessive rates. 37 Discrimination between persons applying for
the use of facilities is forbidden by both actsA8 The Illinois law
prohibits the operator from acting in a dual position by storing
his own grain while doing the same thing for the public, 39 but
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1112, §§ 32, 36 and 41.
36 Ibid., Ch. 114, § 202.
37 Contrast 7 U. S. C. A. § 246, and the regulations appearing in 7 C. F. R. 102.9,
with the statute cited in note 35, ante.
38 Compare 7 U. S. C. A. § 254, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 202.
39 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XIV. See also Hannah v. People, 198 111. 77, 64 N. E. 776
(1902).
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the federal act requires only that receipts issued for such grain
must disclose the true relationship when an operator stores his
own grain.40 The mixing of grain of different grades is regulated
by both acts, as is the practice of sacrificing or rebating storage
charges. 1 Extensive regulation of inadequate, inefficient and
unsafe facilities is provided for under both acts. 2 Operation
without a state license is, of course, forbidden in Illinois, 43 but
no federal license is compulsory. 4 Abandonment of warehouse
service is possible, under the state law, only with commission ap-
proval,45 but is spoken of only with reference to "termination"
in the federal act, one ground for which is "ceasing to do busi-
ness. "6 The filing and publishing of rate schedules have been sub-
jected to control under both.4 7
By the test previously stated, each of the nine matters out-
lined was held, by the Rice case, to be beyond the reach of the
Illinois Commerce Commission, since Congress had declared a pol-
icy on each of the subjects in the federal Warehouse Act. Yet,
the court has not held that an elevator operator is altogether
acquitted of responsibility to state law for he must still conform
to matters of regulation imposed by the state which are not touched
by Congress. State regulation, however, is prohibited as to all
matters "touched," even though lightly, by federal law, for the
prohibition is not limited to those subjects where there is direct
conflict or where there is a precise concurrence in control.48 The
Rice case, then, leaves a little power in the state while serving
to wipe out a great deal of the power formerly enjoyed.
40 7 U. S. C. A. § 250(i).
41 The Illinois restriction appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 204.
The federal view is set out In 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 256, 258 and 262, and in 7 C. F. R.
102.50.
42 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, §§ 32, 49 and 50, with 7 U. S.
C. A. § 243, and with 7 C. F. R. §§ 102.7 and 102.47.
43 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 191.
44 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 243-5; 7 C. F. R. §§ 102.3-102.12.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-,.(, § 49a.
46 7 U. S. C. A. § 246; 7 C. F. R. § 102.9.
47 The state provisions are set out in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, §§ 33
and 35. For the federal stipulations, see 7 C. F. R. § 102.5.
48 That position was advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opin-
ion in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 at 2.38, 67 S. Ct. 1146 at 115ti,
91 L. Ed. 1447 at 1463 (1946).
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The legislative history of the state and federal acts indi-
cates that there existed two distinct purposes to be subserved in
the regulation of grain warehouses. The primary objective of
federal regulation has been to enhance and stabilize the value of
warehouse receipts for use as collateral in financial transactions.
The states, by contrast, have intended their acts as a means by
which to protect the producer and the public from abuses by
warehousemen who occupy a strategic position in the flow of grain
from producer to consumer. Notwithstanding this variation in
purpose, Congress and the Supreme Court have now wiped out
a goodly portion of the accumulation of state legislation which
had been permitted to flourish in the train of Munn v. Illinois.
Advocates of uniformity might well seek to justify the more
recent development. But the cold truth is that the United States
Warehouse Act was not designed to accomplish, nor is it capable,
without implementation, of serving, those ends sought by the
states. While Congress has "touched" upon certain subjects to
the exclusion of the states, it has not seen fit to provide adequate
enforcement provisions, nor has it developed an agency equipped
with either manpower, funds, or the will to enforce its policies.
The abuses which the petitioner in the Rice case complained about
probably still persist, the operators having withdrawn to the pro-
tection of uniform non-regulation by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture through the simple and convenient expedient of obtaining a
federal license. It is true that there is a residue of control left
in the states, but the possibility of using such power in an effec-
tive manner is absent because of the withdrawal of all the im-
portant means by which state law could achieve effective control" 9
49 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447
(1946), also involved three regulatory measures imposed by the Illinois statute
designed to prevent an unwarranted drain on utility funds and the creation of
unsound financial structures. These provisions required commission approval of all
contracts between the utility and its "affiliates," of contracts between the utility
and other public utilities, and for the issuance of certain securities. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111/, §§ 8(a) (3), 21 and 27. It was held that Congress had
not excluded state action on these matters since no provision of the United States
Warehouse Act related to these subjects. The problem of determining whether other
specific state provisions may be valid or not is simply one of examination to see if
the federal act, or the regulations thereunder, have touched on the particular
subject.
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An overworked Secretary of Agriculture has found himself
handed the job of regulating grain warehouses in all major par-
ticulars by an amendment designed to bring about one thing, that
is the strengthening of warehouse receipts. Laissez faire has
been introduced outside the scope of his very narrow powers. As
things now stand, any energetic effort to regulate must be made
by the federal government, since an attempt by the state to do
so will merely force the operator into the arms of the federal
licensing agency and out of the reach of the state. The fact re-
mains, however, that history shows that at no time has Congress
deemed it advisable to introduce compulsory uniformity. The
obvious suggestion, therefore, is that Congress should repeal the
federal law, so as to reinstate local regulation, or provide for an
adequately manned and financially able federal agency to take over
active enforcement of a law comparable to the ones of which
the states have been deprived.
Until that happens, there is not much left for the states to do
in the limited opportunities for regulation left to them. It might
be wise for the states to avoid conflict entirely by exempting fed-
eral licensees from all applications of state law, as has been done
in Idaho, New Mexico and Oklahoma. In the four and one-half
years since the Rice case was decided, however, no state has made
any effort to revise its warehousing laws in the light of that de-
cision. This may be an indication that the need for state regu-
lation has diminished or ceased to exist. Perhaps warehouse regu-
lation has shifted into another phase. But whether or not times
have changed as much as the Rice case would imply will be known
when, and if, the voices of dissatisfaction heard prior to Munn v.
Illinois are again raised against the prevailing system of non-
regulation of the warehousing business.
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VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Where the legislature has authorized an administrative tri-
bunal to exercise a degree of discretion in a particular field, it is
fundamental that the courts, upon a review of the agency's deci-
sion, cannot substitute their judgment for that of the adminis-
trative tribunal. On the other hand, it is equally true that the
reviewing court may determine whether or not the administra-
tive ruling or decision was in conformity with the powers dele-
gated. On several occasions in the past year, the Illinois courts
found it necessary to analyze orders of Civil Service Boards in
respect to this particular problem and these decisions are im-
portant for they define the extent of the authority of such boards
in what were previously uncharted areas.
The first case, that of People ex rel. Polen v. Hoehler,' in-
volved the removal of the plaintiff who enjoyed civil service
status as an employee in the Illinois Soldiers & Sailors Chil-
dren's School. The plaintiff had left her assigned post to at-
tend an ailing sister without giving personal notice to any of
her immediate superiors or to the superintendent of the institu-
tion. This failure arose because none of these individuals were
available at the time of plaintiff's departure, but she did leave
a message, to be forwarded to the superintendent, to the effect
that she was taking advantage of a portion of her vacation allow-
ance. Upon plaintiff's return, she was notified of her dismissal
under a ruling previously adopted by the Commission to the
effect that an employee "absent from duty without leave for a
period of three successive days or longer, without proper written
notice to and approval by his superior officer of the reason for
such action, shall be considered to have resigned."
* Parts I to VI of this survey appeared in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REMUIw pp.
1-104. Limitations as to space required carrying over the balance of the material
to this issue.
1405 Ill. 322, 90 N. E. (2d) 729 (1950).
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The statute governing the powers of the State Civil Service
Commission allows that agency to discharge a civil service em-
ployee for cause but, upon proper application of the affected party,
requires the granting of a hearing in reference to the reason for
the removal. 2  In accordance with this provision, the plaintiff
sought a hearing which the Commission refused to grant on the
theory that, as a resignation and not a discharge was involved,
the hearing requirement was not applicable. Plaintiff thereupon
petitioned for, and was granted, a writ of mandamus. Upon
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was affirmed. 3
That tribunal found the rule so promulgated to be in direct con-
travention of the statute since it contemplated a discharge with-
out the necessity of affording a hearing, even though requested.
The theory that the plaintiff's actions amounted to a resignation
was said to have no logical foundation as the severance of the
individual from her employment occurred automatically, with-
out reference to her own desires or wishes. The merit of the
decision cannot be questioned since the statute clearly manifests
a legislative intent to require a hearing on reasons for discharge,
where one is requested, and any attempt to circumvent such a re-
quirement should be thwarted.
Two companion cases, those of Drury v. Hurley4 and Con-
nelly v. Hurley,5 involved individuals who have recently made
newspaper headlines. It may be recalled that Drury and Con-
nelly, members of the Police Department of the City of Chicago,
were assigned to investigate a number of unsolved murders in-
cluding the shooting of one James Ragen. In due course several
witnesses were located who claimed that they could identify
Ragen's assailants. Signed statements were obtained and, based
thereon, an indictment was handed down. The witnesses later
recanted and, because of their recriminations, the two police of-
ficers were summoned before the grand jury for interrogation
2 Inl. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24 , § 14.
3 Direct appeal was proper since the state was a party to the litigation.
4 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N. E. (2d) 729 (1949). Both leave to appeal and certiorari
have been denied: 339 U. S. 983, 70 S. Ct. 1027, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 923 (1950).
5339 Il1. App. 54, 88 N. E. (2d) 736 (1949). The subsequent history is the
same as that noted in footnote 4, ante.
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concerning their activities during the investigation. They were
asked to sign immunity waivers but refused so to do. They were
immediately suspended and charges were filed against them before
the Civil Service Commission.
The commission, pursuant to statutory authorization empow-
ering it to dismiss any municipal civil service employee for
"cause," ' , determined that the refusal on the part of the police
officers to sign immunity waivers constituted such a cause and
the officers were, as a consequence, discharged. Separate proceed-
ings for writs of certiorari were then instituted and the trial
court, upon reviewing the record, reversed the decision. The Civil
Service Commission appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court,7 but the cases were subsequently transferred to the Ap-
pellate Court because no constitutional question was involved.
That court, in reversing the lower court, pointed to the fact that
the statute under which the commission had proceeded contained
no definition of "cause," hence left it to the discretion of the
agency to determine the exact meaning to be given to that term.
This would not be an instance of uncontrolled discretion, for it
has been decided that the reason for the discharge must bear some
relation to the welfare of the public and the service." It was,
therefore, within the scope of judicial review for the court to
ascertain whether any such relationship existed. The discharge
was upheld on the theory that, as the police officer's primary duty
is to protect the public, the refusal to divulge information which
might aid in the enforcement of law and order is inconsistent with
that duty. It was, of course, argued that the officers had not
refused to testify but merely declined to sign immunity waivers.
The court felt that both types of refusal were equally reprehen-
sible since, in either case, the main aim of those called upon to
disclose information would be to protect themselves from a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution'. If the officers had testified with-
out signing the immunity waiver, it is doubtful that criminal
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24/,, § 51. As to whether the same type of
conduct would be "cause" for the removal of a judge, see In re Holland. 377 Ill.
346, 36 N. E. (2d) 543 (1941).
7 See Drury v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 243, 83 N. E. (2d) 575 (1949).
8 Murphy v. Houston, 250 Il1. App. 385 (1928).
SURVEY OF ILLIA-01S LAW-1949-50
prosecution would have followed because of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination. By so refusing, the police
officers were, in effect, placing self-interest before the interest of
the public. They were, therefore, guilty of action detrimental to
the welfare of the citizenry and the service.
In still another decision, that found in People ex rel. Hurley
v. Graber,9 the Supreme Court recognized two legal devices by
which an administrative tribunal can be prevented from over-
stepping its statutory authority. It appeared that, in 1947, the
state legislature amended the City Civil Service Act to allow war
veterans additional promotional credits based upon service in
the armed forces. 10 In accordance with this provision, certain ex-
servicemen in the Chicago Police Department had been given
promotions which, in the absence of the added credits, would
have gone to non-veteran members. The Supreme Court sub-
sequently decided the amendment was unconstitutional because
it was vague and indefinite," thereby leaving the validity of the
already consummated promotions in doubt. The City Civil Serv-
ice Commission finally took the position, based upon an opinion
furnished by the Corporation Counsel, that the advancements
were invalid. It then made a public announcement that all vet-
erans who had received promotions based on the added credits
would be demoted and restored to their former positions. Two
groups of those who would have been adversely affected by such
an order instituted actions to prevent the demotion. One group
sought a writ of prohibition; the other, an injunction. Both
prayers were granted. The commission then filed an original ac-
tion in the Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus de-
signed to compel the trial judge to expunge these orders from
the record. The Supreme Court, comparing the commission's
power with its contemplated action, determined that the latter
was in clear violation of its statutory authority. It decided that
the power to discharge for "cause" would not support a re-
9405 Ill. 331, 90 N. E. (2d) 763 (1950), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 367.
1o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Ch. 24 , § 49.
11 See People ex rel. Duffy v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 562, 85 N. E. (2d) 26 (1949). The
legislature has since re-enacted the provision, clarifying the portions which the
court considered vague and indefinite: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 241/2, § 49.
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consideration or a demotion after an appointment had been con-
pleted. The commission was, therefore, in no position to ques-
tion the validity of the advancements it had ordered, even though
the same were consummated under an unconstitutional statute.
The remainder of the opinion is concerned with the more in-
teresting and significant procedural questions concerning the avail-
ability of an injunction and the use of a writ of prohibition to
forestall invalid administrative action. The court, when uphold-
ing the injunctive relief, was forced to overcome the simple prop-
osition that, as an individual possesses no property right in a
public office, equity would lack jurisdiction to issue an injunc-
tion in order to prevent his ouster. 12 It did so, in the particular
case, by establishing equity jurisdiction upon the basis of a ne-
cessity to prevent excessive litigation which might otherwise re-
sult from the many demotions there contemplated. As to the
writ of prohibition, the court acknowledged the existence of two
rules governing its use, to-wit: (1) the writ could only be ad-
dressed to an inferior tribunal exercising judicial power, and (2)
the judicial power about to be exercised had to be one in excess
of its jurisdiction. An administrative agency is ordinarily thought
of as an arm of the executive rather than of the judicial branch
of the government; consequently, it might logically be assumed
that a writ of the type sought should not have been granted. The
court, however, looked to the function performed by the Civil
Service Commission and characterized it as being at least quasi-
judicial, thereby finding the first essential element to be present.
That approach is not as startling as it sounds for the Supreme
Court has recognized the quasi-judicial aspects of commissions of
this type when permitting review by means of certiorari.a The
existence of the second element was declared satisfied by the find-
ing of a lack of authority to demote.
In permitting the utilization of both the injunction and the
writ of prohibition, the court appears to have overlooked certain
other factors which have previously governed the availability of
these two remedies. Thus, the issuance of the extraordinary
12 Marshall v. Board of Managers, 201 Il. 9, 66 N. E. 314 (1902).
13 Bartunek v. Lastovken, 350 II. 380, 183 N. E. 333 (1932).
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writ of prohibition has been conditioned upon the fact that the
litigant has lacked any other method for obtaining relief.14 Simi-
larly, equity usually intervenes only in the absence of an ade-
quate legal remedy. Since the court found that injunctive relief
was available, it might logically have refused the writ.15 On the
other hand, as the legal remedy of prohibition was deemed ap-
propriate, it would have been equally logical to have denied the
injunction. 6 The court, by not discussing this aspect of the case,
has simply added to the mist of uncertainty surrounding the use
of extraordinary legal and equitable devices in the field of ad-
ministrative law.
While the reports are void of any significant decisions deal-
ing with the Illinois Administrative Review Act, there have been
several which simply reiterate a position previously taken by the
Supreme Court with reference to the weight to be accorded ad-
ministrative findings of fact. The Act provides such findings and
conclusions are to be considered prima facie true and correct. 17
Soon after the enactment of the statute, the Illinois Supreme
Court interpreted this particular provision as limiting the re-
versal of agency findings to situations where they were against
the manifest weight of the evidence or unsupported by substan-
tial evidence.' 8  This view has been adhered to in an assortment
of decisions handed down during the period of this survey, 9 an
14 People v. Circuit Court of Wash. County, 347 Ill. 34, 179 N. E. 441 (1931).
15 Typically, prohibition has been denied where an ordinary legal remedy such
as a writ of error, etc., could have been utilized. It might, therefore, be argued
that since an injunction does not fall within this classification, its presence as a
possible method of attack should not affect the availability of the extraordinary
writ. This argument was apparently rejected in State v. Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641,
150 N. E. 78 (1925), where the court refused to issue a writ of prohibition on the
ground that relief by injunction was adequate.
16 However, it might be reasonably urged that the extraordinary aspect of the
writ of prohibition took it out of the realm of customary adequate legal remedies
and therefore its availability would not bar the issuance of an injunction.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 274.
18 Drezner v. Civil Service Commission, 398 Ill. 219, 75 N. E. (2d) 303 (1947).
The failure to ad6pt the classical "manifest weight of the evidence" rule or the
"substantial evidence" rule was due to the fact that a previous attempt to utilize
the former in restricting judicial review of agency findings was held unconstitu-
tional as a usurpation of judicial power: Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922).
19 Local Union No. 222, Oil Workers' Int. Union v. Gordon, 406 II. 145, 92 N. E.
(2d) 739 (1950) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N. E. (2d) 381 (1950) ;
Local No. 658, Boot & Shoe Workers' Union v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N. E.
(2d) 625 (1949) ; Overbey v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 339 Ill. App.
574, 90 N. E. (2d) 503 (1950), abst. opin.
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indication that the Illinois courts have adopted the classical view
concerning the scope of judicial review of findings of fact. That
view had previously existed in this state before the enactment
of the new statute and is typical of the one found elsewhere.
CONFLICTS OF LAW
Federal courts sitting in this area were called upon to de-
cide two interesting and complicated conflicts of law problems of
first impression in this jurisdiction. The case of Hynes v. In-
dian Trails, Inc.,20 involved the applicability of a particular pro-
vision in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. The plain-
tiff, a motorman for a Chicago street railroad, sustained injuries
when a motor bus operated by one of the defendant's employees
collided with his street car. He instituted an action sounding
in tort to which the defendant pleaded Section 29 of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act as a bar to the suit.2 1 If the de-
fendant was bound by the Illinois act, dismissal of the plaintiff's
action would be proper for he would have no right to maintain a
common law action and would have to be satisfied with his statu-
tory remedy. In an effort to prove that the Illinois statute con-
trolled the case, the defendant submitted that it was a Michigan
corporation with an office in Chicago; that it operated buses across
Michigan and Indiana into Illinois; and that it had complied with
the provisions of the Illinois Compensation Act, which covered
many of its employees.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, noting that the driver of the
vehicle was a resident of Michigan, had been hired in that state,
and was covered by its statute, pointed to the fact that, as the
defendant was not bound by the Illinois act in its relation to the
particular employee, defendant could not have the advantage of
Section 29. The federal district court agreed with plaintiff and
that decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
20181 F. (2d) 668 (1950). Appeal pending.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166, directs that when a compensable in-
jury arises without the negligence of the employer or his employee, and is caused
under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages in some other person,
other than the employer, then the employer is the one to bring legal proceedings
against the third person.
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enth Circuit. The latter pointed out that the subjection imposed
on the defendant by the Illinois statute as to some of its em-
ployees did not extend to all injuries arising in this state but
that the test to determine the applicability of Section 29 was
whether or not the employee at fault could have secured an award
under the Illinois act if he had been the one who had been injured.
The defendant asserted that, even using such test, it was
entitled to plead the applicable provision since the specific em-
ployee, if he had been injured, could have recovered an award un-
der the Illinois statute. In support of that premise, the de-
fendant cited United States Supreme Court decisions which de-
clare that a state wherein the injury occurs is free to apply its
own compensation laws to the exclusion of the law of the state
of the employer and employee.22 The existence of such deci-
sions was acknowledged by the court but it was noted that the
same were permissive rather than mandatory in character. It
then pointed to the fact that a policy had been developed in Illi-
nois under which its courts would refuse to apply the Illinois
statute in cases where the only contact with Illinois lay in the
fact that the injury occurred within its limits. 23  From this, it
easily followed that the defendant was not in any position to take
advantage of the defense offered by the Illinois statute.
The second case, that of Anderson v. Linton,24 was one com-
menced by the plaintiff as administratrix of her husband's es-
tate for his alleged wrongful death and for her own personal in-
juries sustained in the same accident. It appeared that the col-
lision occurred when a trailer, being transported through the
state of Iowa, became detached from the tractor pulling it, veered
across the highway, and came into contact with the automobile
in which the plaintiff and her husband were driving. The defend-
ants were the transport company and the manufacturer and
assembler of the house trailer, the latter being joined on the
theory that the accident was the direct result of their negligence
in so unskilfully welding the hitch to the trailer that it snapped.
22 See, for example, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939).
23 Cole v. Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520 (1933).
24 178 F. (2d) 304 (1949), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 339.
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The second defendant contended that the welding which con-
stituted the alleged negligence had been done in Illinois, a state
which was said not to permit recovery unless a contractual rela-
tionship exists between the manufacturer and the injured party.
The court declined to pass on the state of the Illinois law on this
particular point, because the actual injury had been inflicted in
Iowa and Iowa law was said to control.25 No Iowa decisions
specifically in point could be found but it was said to be the
law of that jurisdiction to permit suit against a manufacturer
despite the absence of contractual privity. Other contentions,
such as one based on the absence of an Iowa wrongful death stat-
ute and another concerning the appropriate statute of limitations
for the personal injury aspects of the case, were readily an-
swered. 26
The wrongful death portion of the action, however, produced
a more difficult problem as to choice of law. The limitation pe-
riod controlling death cases is typically found in the wrongful
death statute itself so as to be part and parcel of the remedy,
hence a matter of substantive law rather than of procedural law.
Such being the general case, the lex loci delicti normally would
govern and would have required the court to apply the Iowa
limitation period. But, the situation was not susceptible to that
solution for the Iowa survival statute, unlike the usual wrongful
death act, does not contain a limitation provision. The court
then fell back on the ordinary practice of applying the statute of
limitations of the forum. Not even this solved the problem for
Illinois possesses two limitation periods; a general two-year pro-
vision as to most torts, 2 7 and a one-year requirement for wrongful
death actions. 28 The court saw fit to utilize the latter and barred
the suit brought by the administratrix.
25 This was no more than an application of the familiar doctrine calling for
reference to the lex loci delicti in tort cases.
26 The Iowa survival statute was, on the authority of Major v. Burlington, C. R.
& N. Ry. Co., 115 Iowa 309, 88 N. W. 815 (1902), held to warrant suit by the
administratrix to recover for the wrongful death. On the accepted principle that
the law of the forum controls as to procedural matters, Horan v. New Home
Sewing Machine Co., 289 Il. App. 340, 7 N. E. (2d) 401 (1937), the Illinois limita-
tion period was utilized to settle the question of whether the personal injury suit
had been instituted in apt time.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 15.
28 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
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The decision on this phase of the case would appear to be
remarkable. While the action was instituted upon an Iowa law
allowing recovery for wrongful death, the court applied the limi-
tation period fixed by the Illinois statute. As the remedy for
wrongful death cannot usually be separated from its period of
limitation, is it logical to separate the limitation period from the
remedy? If any rationale exists, it might lie in the fact that the
court may have felt that a policy had been established in Illi-
nois to restrict wrongful death actions to a period of one year
which should be applied to suits commenced under the laws of a
sister state where no contrary policy has been manifested.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Aside from constitutional issues presented in People ex rel.
Bernat v. Bicek 29 over legislative attempts to create special di-
vorce divisions in the judicial circuits of the state, only two other
cases possess significance and they deal with the constitutionality
of taxing provisions as applied to non-residents of the state.
The first, entitled Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v.
State of Illinois,30 involved the state inheritance tax. The con-
troversy arose when the deceased, a resident of Cook County, died
testate and left the residue of his estate to the University of
Wisconsin. The County Court entered an order assessing an in-
heritance tax at normal rates to which an objection was filed
based on the proposition that as the Board of Regents was ac-
tually the State of Wisconsin it would be improper to impose a
tax upon a legacy payable to a sovereign state. The lower court
ruled against the contention and, on direct appeal to the Supreme
Court because a question of revenue was involved, the decision
was affirmed.
It having been determined that the tax provisions were ap-
plicable to the Board of Regents, even though it was an instru-
29 405 Ill. 510, 91 N. E. (2d) 588 (1950). See discussion thereof ante under the
heading of Family Law.
30404.111. 193, 88 N. E. (2d) 489 (1949). Appeal dismissed: 339 U. S. 906, 70 S.
Ct. 571, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 454 (1950). Noted in 63 Harv. L. Rev. 709 and 1950
Ill. L. Forum 146.
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mentality of the State of Wisconsin, because it was a corporate
entity,"' the court then considered the various constitutional argu-
ments. The first of these revolved around the contention that the
right of the State of Wisconsin to receive a legacy arose from its
sovereignty which Illinois could not constitutionally restrict. The
Supreme Court quickly disposed of this contention by pointing
out that the right to acquire property under the will of an Illi-
nois resident owes its existence to the law of this state, from
which it followed that Illinois could impose any reasonable re-
striction and regulation upon the right.32 It was then urged
that the Illinois inheritance tax, being based upon the right to
receive a legacy,3 3 constituted a direct burden upon the sover-
eign state. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the tax "is
extracted from the legacy before it passes and therefore the tax
assessed here is not a direct burden upon the Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin or upon Wisconsin even though
it incidentally reduces the legacy. ' 34  This being the very rea-
soning applied by the United States Supreme Court in upholding
the validity of inheritance taxes imposed in identical situations, 35
the decision of the Illinois court appears to be based upon a firm
foundation.36
The Retailers' Occupational Tax Act was the other provision
to come under judicial surveillance. In Norton Company v. De-
partment of Revenue,3 7 the plaintiff filed a claim with the de-
fendant alleging that, in the computation of its tax liability, re-
ceipts from certain types of sales should not have been included
31 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375, is made to apply to a "person," an
"institution," or to a "corporation."
32Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122, 47 N. E. 321 (1897).
33 Ibid.
34404 Ill. 193 at 201, 88 N. E. (2d) 489 at 493.
85 U. S. v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41 L. Ed. 287 (1895). Reference
to that case was made by the United States Supreme Court when it dismissed the
appeal in the instant case: 339 U. S. 906, 70 S. Ct. 571, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 454
(1950).
30 The Illinois legislature, in 1945, amended the Inheritance Tax Act to allow
the same exemption to institutions of sister states as is enjoyed by those organized
in Illinois, if reciprocal exemption is granted: Ill. Laws 1945, p. 1242, S. B. No.
183. The provision was inapplicable to the particular case as the controversy
arose before the amendment took effect.
37405 Ill. 314, 90 N. E. (2d) 737 (1950). Gunn, J., dissented.
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in the final figure utilized as the tax base.38 The plaintiff was a
Massachusetts corporation with its plant and main office in that
state, but it maintained a branch office and a small warehouse
in Chicago. The controverted sales fell into one or the other of
two types: (1) those wherein the orders were sent by Illinois
customers direct to Massachusetts, were filled there, and the goods
were then shipped to the purchasers; or (2) those wherein orders
were transmitted from the Chicago office to Massachusetts to be
filled from the last mentioned place because the items requested
were not kept in stock in the Illinois warehouse. The Department
of Revenue rendered a decision adverse to the plaintiff and, upon
appeal under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, 39
the trial court affirmed the decision. Again, on direct appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court because a question of revenue was in-
volved, the judgment was affirmed.
The mere fact that a state levies a tax upon transactions
which are merely a part of interstate activity does not neces-
sarily mean that the tax is unconstitutional. It must reach the
point of being a burden on interstate commerce before invalidity
will be declared. In cases of this kind, courts have usually con-
sidered two factors: (1) whether the tax discriminates against
interstate transactions; and (2) whether the activities occurring in
the taxing state are of sufficient magnitude to warrant the as-
sessment, for extensive operations receiving the benefit of state
protection should share the tax burden. As the company was
obligated to pay no more than the same tax required of resi-
dents and citizens, there was no discrimination. The court also
concluded that, since the plaintiff maintained an office and ware-
house in Illinos, it conducted a sufficient amount of its interstate
activity here to warrant a tax upon its gross receipts from Illinois
purchasers even though some of the orders were filled in Massa-
chusetts. The plaintiff was obviously doing more than simply
soliciting orders in the state.40
38 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 441, states that the tax Is to be com-
puted upon the gross receipts from the sale of tangible personal property.
39 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
40 It has been held that the activity of doing no more than soliciting orders in
the state cannot be taxed: Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wright, I83 Ill. 363, 50 N. E.
(2d) 508 (1948).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Attention has been directed, in another section of this sur-
vey, to two important cases respecting the discharge of municipal
police officers for refusal to sign immunity waivers when called
before the grand jury to be examined concerning their activities. 41
Other aspects of the law relating to municipal corporations have
also been settled during the past year. The case of People v.
Levinson,42 for example, received almost as much attention from the
press because the Supreme Court there reversed the conviction of
the parents of a seven-year old girl who had been charged with
a violation of the compulsory school attendance law.43 It found
the child to be in attendance at a "private school," inasmuch as
the child's mother was supplying it with instruction at home com-
parable to that given in the public schools. Parents who send
their children to established private schools are, of course, exempt
from the compulsory school attendance law. It should be noted,
however, that the burden of showing the home-taught substitute
is adequate in terms of prescribed courses of instruction rests
upon parents who would wish to take advantage of any such ex-
emption.
Two attempts by cities to impose licenses upon particular
pursuits led to decisions of interest. *While the statute does not
empower cities to license, tax or regulate insurance agents, 44 it
was held, in City of Chicago v. Barnett,45 that a license may prop-
erly be required of an insurance broker. The decision was based
upon the fact that the word "broker" was used in the statute
and that term was said to include within its meaning all per-
sons who bore that relationship, regardless of the type of busi-
ness in which they might engage. Greenhouse operators, accord-
ing to Yougquist v. City of Chicago,46 are "wholesalers" within
41 See discussion of Drury v. Hurley, 339 I1. App. 54, 88 N. E. (2d) 729 (1949),
and of Connelly v. Hurley, 339 I1. App. 54, 88 N. E. (2d) 736 (1949), ante, under
the heading of Administrative Law.
42404 Ill. 574, 90 N. E. (2d) 213 (1950).
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 26-1.
44 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-91.
45404 I1. 136, 88 N. E. (2d) 477 (1949).
46 405 Ill. 21, 90 N. E. (2d) 205 (1950).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAIV-1949-50
the provision of a city ordinance and a statute empowering the
city to license florists,4 7 but are also entitled to the benefit of a
statute granting immunity to farmers, gardeners, and the like,
from tax or license 4 8 on the theory that the operators thereof
qualify as "gardeners."
Further indication of the territorial limitations which exist
on the powers of a city to regulate milk production is contained
in three cases decided during the year.49 Although the ordinances
there concerned were dissimilar, all three attempted, to some
degree, to restrict the sale of milk products produced beyond the
corporate limits. All three were declared void by reason of at-
tempts to exercise extra-territorial powers which had not been
conferred upon the municipalities by the legislature.
One case in the field of municipal tort liability took still an-
other situation out of the group of incidents which are neither
fish nor fowl until a decision makes them so. The Supreme Court,
in Johnson v. City of East Molinc,'° upheld the judgment of a
lower court which had imposed liability on a city for its negli-
gent failure to replace a damaged traffic signal, the absence of
which had caused the plaintiff to enter an intersection protected
only by signals controlling traffic from the three other directions.
Such maintenance was said to be a corporate, rather than a gov-
ernmental, function despite the fact that the weight of authority
in other states is to the contrary. The decision, however, may be
said to in harmony with a long-followed tendency in Illinois to
squeeze many activities into the corporate function category so
long as the activity bears some connection with street mainte-
nance.51
Worthy of at least brief mention is the case of Daniels v.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-91.
48 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 5, § 91.
49 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan. 403 Ill. 597, 87 N. E. (2d) 751 (1949);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N. E. (2d) 827 (1949); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill. 204, 90 N. E. (2d) 112 (1950). See also comments in
28 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIEW 173, 1950 Ill. L. Forum 142, and 38 Ill. B. J. 235.
50405 Ill. 460, 91 N. E. (2d) 401 (1950), affirming 338 Ill. App. 220, 87 N. E.
(2d) 22 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIw 264.
51 See Green, "Freedom of Litigation," 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944), and comment
in 45 Ill. L. Rev. 124.
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Cavner,52 a decision of first impression. It was there determined
that a statute which requires the filing with the clerk of the mu-
nicipality of nomination papers at least thirty-five days previous
to the date of election 53 is not satisfied by an attempted filing with
the clerk at his home after business hours on the last day for
filing. Cases from other jurisdictions were followed in the course
of a discussion which indicated that the "filing" must be done
at the clerk's official place of business during the usual business
hours.
The only significant case involving any element of tax law hap-
pened also to be one with aspects of municipal law. An attempt
by a village to exact a sum equivalent to three per cent. of the
gross receipts of all firms who had been granted authority to man-
tain pipes, poles, conduits, and the like, in streets or public places,
was declared improper in Village of Lombard v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Company.5 4 While both the litigants were in some doubt
as to the nature of the charge, the Supreme Court held it in-
valid regardless of terminology. If it was intended to be a rental
arrangement, it was improper because the municipality had no
power to rent the streets. Viewed as an occupation tax, the lack
of legislative authority for such an enactment was clearly fatal
to its success. 55
TRADD REGULATION
No novel concepts are involved in the only decision having
bearing on the law of trade regulation but it is appropriate to note
that the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decision holding the
Mandatory Fair Trade Act to be invalid.51 The question of the
power of the legislature to enact the controls intended thereby,
and to impose uniform price standards on retailers of liquor, was
52404 Ill. 372, 88 N. E. (2d) 823 (1949).
53 Iln. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 1O--6.
54 405 I1. 209, 90 N. E. (2d) 105 (1950).
55 Other tax cases, such as Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 404 Ill. 193, 88 N. E. (2d) 489 (1949), and McLaughlin v. People, 403 InI.
493, 87 N. E. (2d) 637 (1949), are discussed ante under the headings of Constitu-
tional Law and Family Law, respectively.
56 See Ill. Liquor Con. Com'n v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 403 Ill. 578, 88
N. H. (2d) 15 (1949).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAV-191,9-50
not reached. Instead, the court found the act to be an attempt
to amend the Liquor Control Act in a maner violative of Sec-
tion 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution or, if not, was
incomplete in its provisions, hence ineffective to stand as an in-
dependent statute.
VIII. TORTS
Traditional tort questions concerning the liability of own-
ers of animals for injury done by their beasts still receive atten-
tion in states where open range conditions exist, but rarely does
an Illinois court have trouble with the matter. One recent Ap-
pellate Court decision would indicate that general principles of
negligence have taken charge of situations where, at common law,
absolute liability might have been imposed as well as in cases
where statutes have tended to place strict liability on motorists
who tangle with animals found running at large. In Guay v. Neel,'
it was decided that a motorist was not entitled to recover for
damage sustained in a collision with an escaped horse, provided
the owner of the animal had used due care in restraining it.2
With equal detachment, the court said the owner would be unable
to recover on a counterclaim for damage to his livestock if the
motorist was free from negligence.
Recognizing a trend away from the doctrine which permits
of an immunity in favor of a municipal corporation for the torts
of its agents while acting in the course of a governmental ac-
tivity, the Appellate Court for the First District added its bit to
the mounting collection of objections to that theory by its holding
in Both v. Collis. The court there construed the 1945 amend-
ment to the Cities and Villages Act,4 one which placed a munici-
pality in the position of indemnitor as to judgments recovered
against policemen, to presuppose liability on the part of the po-
liceman. As a consequence, it denied the defendant officer's con-
tention that immunity attached to his actions. The section of the
1340 Il1. App. 111, 91 N. E. (2d) 151 (1950).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 8, § 1.
3339 Il1. App. 437, 90 N. E. (2d) 285 (1950).
4 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
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statute in question had previously implied that personal immunity
existed because of the presence of the words "the municipality
only . shall be liable." There is reason to wonder why a
statute with so obvious a purpose cannot be drawn by which to
leave no doubt about the position of the city and its employees on
the question of liability or immunity. Section 1-13 of the same
chapter expressly immunizes firemen, putting liability on the mu-
nicipality for the negligent operation of motor vehicles used by
the fire department. The considerations seem to be identical in
the two cases, hence one can only speculate over the necessity of
two or three amendments, each accompanied by confusion caused
by a switching of theories, to accomplish so simple an objective as
the stating of the liability or the immunity attaching to the city
and its employees.
A unique challenge to the inference of negligence arising in
res ipsa loquitur cases was presented in Siniarski v. Hudson.5 In
that case, three workmen of the defendant had been killed while
replacing a boiler, so that the defendant was as much in the dark
as to the cause of the explosion as was the plaintiff. The defend-
ant urged that, as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had been
founded on the premise that those in control when the mishap
occurred would best be able to explain how it occurred, the death
of the three workmen prevented defendant from having knowl-
edge of the circumstances superior to that of the plaintiff, as
is posited by the rule. The attempted qualification was rejected
and the court ruled that the question of negligence was properly
submitted to the jury, irrespective of the fact that the defendant's
difficulty in seeking to overcome the inference of negligence would
be as acute as would be that of the plaintiff in establishing it.
Disparagement, or slander of title, received attention in the
case of Pendleton v. Time, Incorporated,6 when the painter of the
first portrait of Truman, as president, brought an action for al-
leged injury sustained when the defendant published another
portrait with a caption identifying it as the first such product.
5 338 IlM. App. 137, 87 N. E. (2d) 137 (1949).
6 339 Il1. App. 188, 89 N. E. (2d) 435 (1950). Niemeyer, J., dissented.
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The plaintiff alleged loss of advantage accruing to him by virtue
of his priority in execution; loss of sale value of the portrait; and
loss of commissions to do further portrait work. A majority of
the court felt that the plaintiff had complained of sufficient dam-
age to state a cause of action. The dissenting opinion, however,
more nearly sets forth the requirements, as they are generally
stated, for an action of this type. It points out that the great
weight of authority requires one to allege the special damage with
particular care, so that the complaint of pecuniary injury must
result from the failure of a specific sale or the loss of definite
customers.
7
The more conventional type of libel came up for consideration
on three occasions when plaintiffs complained that they had been
described as communists, fascists, pro-Nazis, and the like.8 In
none of the cases could the court find that the plaintiff had ac-
tually been named as a communist. In one of them,9 however, the
Appellate Court for the First District, by way of dicta, recog-
nized that characterizing a person as a communist and as an un-
American disciple of fascism would be libellous per se, citing
federal decisions in support of that position. 10 A careless de-
fendant may yet make some Illinois law on the point.
7 See comments on the decision in the instant case appearing in 30 Boston U. L.
Rev. 278, 35 Corn. L. Q. 899, 12 Det. L. J. 154, and 38 Ill. B. J. 588.
8 Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Ptg. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E. (2d) 635 (1950);
Parmalee v. Hearst Pub. Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N. E. (2d) 512 (1950) ; McWil-
liams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 Ill. App. 83, 89 N. E. (2d) 266 (1949).
9 Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Ptg. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E. (2d) 635 (1950).
10 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. (2d) 619 (1947); Holden v. American News Co., 52
F. Supp. 24 (1943).
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RAIN MAKING AND THE LAW*
The advent of recent technological advances in the field of meteorology,
frequently referred to as rain-making or weather control, have propounded
new and interesting problems to the lawyer as well as to the scientist.' It
is clear, from a description of the methods employed in weather control,
that not only will the environment of the social group be affected, but that
the rights of 'individuals are also likely to be concerned. The technique
used most generally, at the present time, is one by which iodide particles
are injected into rain clouds, either by dispersal from aircraft or by send-
ing the same up from the ground in the form of smoke. These dispersed
particles, due to their temperature and mass, hasten the coming of the
point at which the moisture in the clouds normally condenses and falls
as rain or snow. The accelerated precipitation induced thereby then falls
upon the terrain beneath, which land area might not, by reason of the
movement of the clouds, otherwise receive the benefit of such moisture.
It is obvious that rights in land, air 2 and water may be affected by
such activity. Benefits, unquestionably, are to be derived from the new
technique.8 In California, for example, many acres of valuable timber
land were recently saved from forest fire in this way.4 Water-parched
communities in the east have replenished water sources in advance of
normal dates. But there is no doubt that "wrongs" done by these rain
makers will bring problems to the attorney's office for solution and courts
will be faced with the job of making new law.
At present, the attorney faced with a problem concerning rain-making
* This comment summarizes the arguments advanced by a team representing
Chicago-Kent College of Law in the 1950 National Law School Moot Court Com-
petition. The team, consisting of John P. Demling and Russell L. Engber, with
Alan D. Katz and David S. Pochis on the brief, defeated representatives of the
University of Illinois College of Law, the University of Chicago Law School and
the University of Notre Dame School of Law to win the championship both in
Illinois and the area covered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1 See article entitled "Weather Under Control," Fortune Magazine, February, 1948.
2 Rain making activities may have an adverse effect upon the operator of aircraft
although this phase of the problem is not discussed herein. See, for example, Sec-
tion 5 of the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act, 11 Unif. Laws Anno., p. 177.
3 The blessings are not always unmixed, even to the rainmakers. Time Magazine,
Vol. LVII, No. 11, p. 54, under date of March 12, 1951, reports the experience of
two California weather consultants who ascended a mountain near Santa Barbara
to fulfill a contract with the city. Their machinery worked too well. When they
were ready to quit for the day they found they were snowbound. Rescue squads
summoned by radio had to bulldoze their way through four-foot drifts for three
days before it was possible to bring the snowmakers down to civilization.
4 New York Times, July 8, 1950, carried a report of the incident.
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will, unfortunately, find little to aid him in the form of reported precedent
bearing directly in point. One decision has served, thus far, to introduce
the problem to the law reports. In the case of Slutsky v. City of New York,"
a hotel resort owner sought to enjoin the city from carrying on its rain-
making activities6 on the ground that the same were endangering his resort
business. The court, denying relief, stated: "The relief which the plain-
tiffs ask is opposed to the general welfare and public good; and the dangers
which plaintiffs apprehend are purely speculative. This court will not
protect a possible private injury at the expense of a positive public ad-
vantage. "7 Because of the superior public interest involved, and because
the plaintiffs had not otherwise shown themselves sufficiently damaged, or
even in danger of being damaged, the case is one of limited value.
Lacking direct precedent upon the point, a pure logical analysis of
the problem may be made in an effort to understand the issues likely to be
raised by weather control as well as to point the way toward their solution.
In much the same way, the existing body of the common law may be ex-
amined in order to achieve the same goals. To a limited extent, this note
is directed to that end but in any discussion of pertinent principles of
the common law it will be assumed that the rights involved are private
rather than public, at least to the extent that those concepts may be
disconnected. It will also be assumed that the "wrongs" complained
of have arisen from an individual's relationship to his real property, for
the initial problems in this field will arise when one person, in his success-
ful effort to supply himself and his land with water, has thereby either
deprived another person of that water or has, without that intention, over-
supplied the other with it. Again, the problem will be considered primarily
from the point of view involved.
The question first presents itself, upon learning that rain making in-
volves an alteration in both cloud formation and cloud constituency,
whether one may, in any way, lay claim to a legal title to the clouds
themselves so as to be in a position to claim damages, even if nominal,
from the rain maker who has "seeded" the clouds. The layman, it is
submitted, would have little difficulty giving an answer to such a query.
He would say that, clouds being but a part of things natural, only nature,
or the deities, might lay claim to them. The essence of such thinking is
also found in the law. Some things have been said to be the proper sub-
ject of private ownership; other things are not." According to Blackstone,
most things are naturally subject to private ownership, but other things,
5 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 (1950).
6 The City of New York was, at the time, suffering from a severe water shortage:
New York Times, August 18, 1950, p. 23.
7 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 at 240.
8 Just. Inst., Lib. 2, Tit. 1.
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at least while in their natural state, are not. These latter, he has said,
must be reduced to possession before they may be classified as being subject
to private ownership. Among such things, he has categorized light, air,
water, and animals ferae naturae.9 Upon this ground, it may be said that
clouds, in their natural state, are not the proper subject of private owner-
ship, hence one may not claim injury to his property in the clouds them-
selves for he has no such property. But what of the rain maker? May
he be said to act so as to reduce the clouds to his possession? Beside the
extreme burden of proving such a possession, it would seem that one can
never be said to possess that which he cannot contain, either as fish are
caught in a net or as land is circumscribed by a boundary. It is sub-
mitted, then, that one may not be said to possess clouds, as that term is
used in the common law, they being of such vague and fugitive nature
as to remain among those things which can never be subjected to private
ownership.
Denying that one might claim legal title to the clouds as such, does it
follow that the individual may not claim a beneficial interest in the use
of the clouds? The common law theory of natural rights derived from
one's ownership of land is not limited merely to the right to exclusive
occupancy of the surface. It embraces many aspects of property rights,
often designated by special names, such as the right to enjoyment, to
lateral support, to riparian rights, and others. May ownership not also
encompass another natural right to the uninterrupted fall of rain thereon?
It is possible that analogy may be found in the law respecting water rights
which may indicate the extent to which one may enjoy rights to the fall
of rain. The fact that clouds are essentially nothing more than floating
bodies of tiny droplets of water causes the mind to look first to the latter
possibility.
The law concerning natural watercourses, a portion of the law of
water, defines a natural watercourse as a body of water which flows in
a known and defined channel. 10 Generally speaking, if land touches upon
such a watercourse, the owner thereof is called a riparian owner and, as
such, is entitled to certain benefits in the water supply." He may use
the stream flowing past his land for "domestic" or agricultural purposes,
but may not, according to the common law, divert the water for other pur-
9 B1. Com., Vol. 1, Book 2, *14. The theory of ownership of even tangible per-
sonalty, at common law, involved occupancy as an element: 2 Co. Litt., § 416. See
also Holmes, The Common Law, p. 216. An example of this element of occupancy,
at least as to the ownership of animals ferae naturae, may be found in Pierson v.
Post, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805).
10 Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. v. Pound, 220 Mich. 475, 190 N. W. 248 (1922). See
also Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States (Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Fran-
cisco, 1911), 3d Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 333 and 380; Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. 1, § 297.
11 Kinyon, "What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do?", 21 Minn. L. Rev. 512 (1937).
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poses nor pollute the same.12  The basis of such a rule lies in the fact
that the owner of land situate upon a watercourse is said to have a
"natural" right, from his favored position adjacent thereto, to the use
of the water as a concomitant to his use of the land. In addition, he
is said to have a right to have the stream flow along its natural course
at its natural rate.'" This common law view has been expanded into the
"reasonable user" rule, which doctrine contemplates that he will make
no more than a reasonable use of the riparian stream so as to allow others
to enjoy its benefits. 4 One attempting to find analogy in this body of law
to the situation here considered, may find substantiation to a large degree
in the exercise of common sense.
A farmer who owns land considers himself as owning more than the
mineral and carbon compounds of the soil itself. He considers the adja-
cent stream a necessary element to the beneficial use of that soil. It may
well be said that rain is no less a necessary element. To deprive him of
the rain that would ordinarily fall on his land is to injure him; to aid
him by causing the proper amount of rain to be deposited on his soil
benefits him. The artificial rain-maker may act so as to produce either
result. But is the similarity of situation one of sufficient degree to war-
rant the application of the law of natural watercourses to the art of rain
making? It should be remembered that that body of law grew out of
the idea that watercourses follow defined channels; that they flow with
sufficient constancy as to enable the taking of a measurement of the
degree of interference with their natural states. Clouds seldom flow,
over a period of time and over a single parcel of land, at anything near so
constant a form or at so constant a rate. They are vague and wandering
things; now here, now gone. This factual difference should cause the
attempted analogy to fail, for the mind would have little trouble dis-
tinguishing between the .two factual situations.
There exists, however, in addition to the common law views concern-
ing rights in natural watercourses, another view known as the doctrine
of prior appropriation. This doctrine, followed in many of the western
states," treats water as belonging to all people in common16 but permits
one to acquire preferential rights in the water if he can (1) show an intent
to apply the water to some beneficial use; (2) demonstrates that he has
12 Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903).
'3 Taylor v. Rudy, 99 Ark. 128, 137 S. W. 574 (1911) : Druley v. Adams, 102 Il.
177 (1882) : Lawrence v. Whitney, 115 N. Y. 410, 22 N. E. 174 (1889).
14 Southern California Investment Co. v. Wilshire, 144 Cal. 68, 77 P. 767 (1904):
Smith v. Corbit, 116 Cal. 587, 48 P. 725 (1897) ; Garwood v. New York Cent. & II.
Ry. Co., 83 N. T. 400, 38 Am. Rep. 452 (1881).
15 Wiel, "'Priority' in Western Water Law," 18 Yale L. J. 189 (1909).
16 Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P. (2d) 648
(1937).
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made a diversion thereof from the natural channel, as by a canal; and (3)
has made an application of the water, within a reasonable time, to some
useful industry.17  Under this view, if one has met the requirements in
order to be a prior appropriater, he may appropriate the entire stream.'"
Now, what of the rain maker? May he be said to be a prior appropriater?
It would seem not. He may have intended to appropriate the water in
the clouds, may wish to make an appropriation thereof for some useful
purpose, but he could hardly be said to have diverted the "natural
stream" of moisture from its course, as by some canal or conduit. He has
no control over the rain after it begins to fall. He hopes that the force of
gravity, and the wind, will cause "his" rain to fall where he desires it,
but there is no assurance that it will do so."9
Having thus seen that the law as to natural water courses provides a
seeming, but nevertheless inexact, analogy to the problem of weather con-
trol, one should consider whether some other aspect of water law provides
a better analogy. If clouds are vague and wandering things, not apt
to travel in well-defined courses, may the law as to percolating waters be
of help? Waters of that character move beneath the surface of the earth
but are not confined to any known and well defined channel.2°  To that
extent, they possess characteristics similar to those of clouds and, unlike
the waters flowing along natural watercourses or underground streams,
they also possess the characteristic of not being readily accessible for the
purpose of measurement either as to quantity or rate of flow. If land be
likened to air space, and percolating water within the land considered
to be like the moisture within the clouds, a rather persuasive analogy
begins to appear. Now what would be the result if the law of percolating
waters were to be applied to the activities of the rain-maker?
In the first place, two distinct views exist as to the right to claim en-
joyment of percolating waters. The common law rule treats such per-
colating waters as being at the absolute disposal of the owner of the land
where the same may be found. According to that rule, the land owner
17 McDonald v. Bear River Min. Co., 13 Cal. 233 (1859); State ex rel. Crowley
v. District Court, 108 Mont. 89, 88 P. (2d) 23 (1939) ; Tammer v. Provo Reservoir
Co., 99 Utah 139, 98 P. (2d) 695 (1940).
18 Hammon v. Rose, 11 Colo. 524, 19 P. 466 (1888) ; Boltar v. Garrett, 44 Ore. 304,
75 P. 142 (1904).
19 It is precisely this lack of control over the fall of rain water which may lead
to the institution of tort actions. An extremely effective job of rain making may
cause the inundation of land owned by one who has not bargained with the rain
maker for any rain at all and who may resent the damage so caused. The case of
Slutsky v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 730, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 238 (1950), may have
reached a different result if the resort proprietor had been able to show a real
injury to his seasonal prospects from too much rain making in his area.
20 Barclay v. Abraham, 21 Iowa 619, 96 N. W. 1080 (1903); Williams v. Ladew,
161 Pa. 283, 29 A. 54 (1894) ; Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keil, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719
(1902-).
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would not be liable, in damages, if his taking of the water prevents, or
injures, others in their use of the percolating waters.21  Most courts in
this country, however, have followed a doctrine described as the "reason-
able user" rule, 22 one which limits the right to take percolating water to
the extent that the taking thereof is necessary for some useful purpose
having a relation to the land from within which the water is taken.23
Either aspect of the rule could possess usefulness in the rain making situ-
ation. For example, one who seeks to cause rain clouds to condense over
his land could claim, under the common law doctrine, that he had an
absolute right to appropriate the water if he could extract it from the
clouds. The other, injured by being deprived of his prospective rain,
might complain under the "reasonable user" doctrine. The outcome
would, of course, depend on the court's acceptance of the analogy and
also, assuming proof to be possible, on the particular version of the
doctrine followed in the jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that
the analogy between percolating waters and waters present in rain clouds
has some persuasion in reason. There is value also in the fact that the
law relating to percolating waters provides a substantial and well-known
body of precedent ready for application in suit based upon the use or
deprivation of rain water.
There is the further possibility that the law relating to surface waters
may also be applied, by analogy, to the problem at hand. Waters of
that kind, as the name implies, exist on the face of the earth but not
contained in defined streams, channels, or basins, and the nature thereof
is such that the landowner may make use thereof absolutely.24 Particularly
pertinent may be that portion of the law relating to the obstruction of
surface waters. In that regard, three general rules have been developed.
One such rule, evolved at common law, holds that a landowner may, at
will, prevent surface waters from coming onto his land.25  In contrast,
the civil law rule declares that all land is under a servitude to receive the
21 Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859) ; Acton v.
Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843) ; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn.
533, 52 Am. Dec. 352 (1850) ; Braidburn Realty Corp. v. East Orange, 107 N. J. L.
291, 153 A. 714 (1931).
22 See, for example, O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 Cal. (2d) 416, 55 P. (2d) 834 (1936)
Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909) ; Forbell v. New
York, 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644 (1900).
23 Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862) ; Dunbar
v. Sweeney, 230 N. Y. 609, 130 N. E. 913 (1921). As to an additional "correlative
rights" doctrine, see Snake Creek Min. & Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 260
U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed. 423 (1923).
24 Motil v. Boyd, 115 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458 (1926). See also Restatement, Torts,
Vol. 4, § 846; 56 Am. Jur., Water, § 65; and Kinyon & McClure, "Interference with
Surface Waters," 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1940).
25 Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41, 112 S. W. 173 (1908) ; Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass. 181
(1868).
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flow of surface water.2 6 There is a third view, seemingly a minority one,
which uses the test of reasonableness of conduct." While these rules may
be of little value in determining the right of the rain-maker to remove
moisture from the clouds, they may be helpful in determining his liability,
if any, to adjacent landowners upon whose land the excess waters may be
cast. The particular rule to be urged, on the basis of analogy, will, of
course, depend upon the given facts and the interest sought to be advanced
or protected.
It is not possible to leave the subject without making some reference
to the law relating to oil and gas, a body of principles which, at least in
the early stages of its development in this country, sprang to a large degree
from analogy to common law principles. It may be remembered that a
landowner may appropriate all the oil and gas which he can reduce to his
possession, even though, by so doing, he may exhaust the supply beneath
his neighbor's land, for oil and gas are of fugacious nature. The only
qualification that has been expressed to that doctrine, except for statutory
regulation, has been based on the idea that the landowner may not waste-
fully or unnecessarily injure the common reservoir of oil or gas.28  Deci-
sions respecting oil and gas may have utility, but cases concerning per-
colating and surface waters should prove more useful. Since they have
to do with water, they should possess an inherent psychological effect
which might not be gained from the use of cases concerning other fluids or
gases.
To this point, the problem has been considered as one arising between
individuals. History records that nations have collapsed, entire civiliza-
tions have been blotted out, for lack of rainfall or access to water. It is
easy to see, therefore, that the public at large has an interest in the supply
of rain. Since the public interest may be involved, there is just reason for
application of the principle of sovereignty reflected in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Rain-making activities, from their very nature,
take effect beyond the land boundaries of but a few persons; in fact, may
well extend beyond the boundaries of a state. Interstate compacts over
the use of waters in certain transcontinental rivers are not unknown, so it
well may be that the art of rain-making presents a field ripe for legislature
regulation. Of necessity, that regulation should be by the federal govern-
ment to avoid internicine conflict. No attempt will be made to discuss
constitutional and policy questions inherent in such a proposal. It is only
submitted that, if put to the test, the common law may furnish a working
26 Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869) ; West v. Taylor, 16 Ore. 165, 13 P. 665
(1888).
27 Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870).
28 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed., 729 (1900);
Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665, 15 S. Ct. 245, 39 L. Ed. 304 (1894).
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basis for the solution of problems which could arise out of litigation
between private parties; but, due to the far-reaching effect which weather
control may have on the nation, the common law will probably fall short
of furnishing a solution for all of the conceivable situations which might
arise.
2
9
R. L. ENGBER
29 For other discussions on the subject, see Brooks, "Legal Aspects of Rain-
making," 37 Cal. L. R. 114 (1949) ; Ball, "Shaping the Law of Weather Control,"
58 Yale L. J. 213 (1949) ; and notes in 1 Stan. L. Rev. 43 and 508.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
BILLS AND NOTES-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON ENDORSEMENT OR TRANS-
FER-WHETHER OR NOT ENDORSEMENT OF A 'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT BY
AN IMPOSTER PAYEE SERVES TO PASS TITLE TO A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-
Following the modern trend of authority, the rights of a holder of a
negotiable instrument, in Illinois, have again triumphed over those of
the drawer. In the recent case of Greenberg v. A. & D. Motor Sales, Inc.,,
1341 Il1. App. 85, 93 N. E. (2d) 90 (1950).
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the Appellate Court for the First District was presented with a fact
situation which revealed that the defendant, a corporate dealer in used
automobiles, was offered an opportunity to purchase a used car from one
who was unknown to it. He represented himself to be the owner of the
automobile, one Wallace Gross, when in fact he had no interest therein.
Relying on this representation, as well as on a driver's license produced
by the imposter, defendant accepted the offer and delivered its check, pay-
able to "Wallace Gross", drawn on a local bank, to the purported vendor.
That person then endorsed the instrument, using the name of the payee,
and presented the check to the plaintiff at the latter's currency exchange.
Plaintiff discounted the instrument only after first communicating with
the defendant by telephone, receiving confirmation as to the identity of
the imposter and being assured that the instrument would be honored by
the drawee bank upon proper presentation. Prior to the time permitted
for presentation of the check to the drawee for payment, defendant dis-
covered the automobile was owned by one other than the person to whom
it had delivered its check and ordered the instrument returned as bearing
a forged endorsement. Plaintiff brought an action on the check, alleging
the issuance thereof by the defendant to one purporting to be the named
payee, followed by plaintiff's purchase thereof from such payee in good
faith, for value, and without notice of any defect in the payee's title.
The defendant, relying on Section 43 of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments
Act,2 asserted that no title passed because of the forgery. The trial court
held the defense inapplicable, particularly since the defendant did not
deny issuance of the instrument to the person who purported to be the
named payee, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The
Appellate Court, on review, affirmed the decision, applying the so-called
"imposter" rule, one well known in the law relating to commercial trans-
actions.
The principal contention of the drawer, advanced in cases of this type,
has been that the endorsement of the imposter is a forgery under which
no title can pass as against the drawer. In order that there be a forged
instrument, however, the signature or endorsement must have been made
by one other than the person intended by the drawer as the party entitled
to receive payment. It is obvious, therefore, that the intention of the
drawer becomes the true issue in each of these cases. In that regard, the
general rule adhered to by the majority of the courts is that where the
drawer delivers a check, draft, or bill of exchange to an imposter as payee,
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 43, declares: "Where a signature is forged
or made without authority, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the
instrument or to give a discharge thereof, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up
the forgery or want of authority."
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supposing that he is the person he has falsely represented himself to be,
the imposter's endorsement in the name by which the payee is described is
regarded as a genuine endorsement, both as between the drawer and
drawee3 and as to subsequent holders in due course. 4
On the issue of intent, if it appears that the drawer has dealt with
the imposter, in his physical presence, and has personally delivered the
instrument to him, as in the case under discussion, it has generally been
held that it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the drawer in-
tended the person of the imposter to be the real payee.5 If, however, the
imposter was not physically before the drawer, but has induced delivery
of the instrument to himself through the employment of an intermediary
agency, such as correspondence, 6 a few of the courts have concluded that
the probable intent was to make the person named the real payee, rather
than the person of the imposter.' The additional fact that the drawer had
previously known one bearing the name used in the instrument has been
of significance in leading to the same conclusion." Furthermore, where the
3 Continental Bank v. U. S., 161 F. (2d) 935 (1947); Union Bank v. Security
Bank, 8 Cal. (2d) 303, 65 P. (2d) 355 (1937) ; Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37 P. (2d) 483 (1934); Hartford Indemnity Co. v.
Middleton Bank, 126 Conn. 179, 10 A. (2d) 604 (1939); Uriole v. Twin Falls Trust
Co., 37 Ida. 332, 215 P. 1080 (1923); U. S. Cold Storage Co. v. Manufacturer's
Bank, 343 Ii1. 503, 175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811 (1931) ; Cooper v. Peoples Savings
Bank, 219 Ill. App. 447 (1920); Karoly v. Globe Savings Bank, 64 Ill. App. 225
(1896), but the statement is dicta; Hoge v. First National Bank, 18 Ill. App. 501
(1886) ; Metzge v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 359, 21 N. E. 973 (1889); Meridian
National Bank v. First National Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N. E. 247 (1893) ; Halsey
v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936) ; Seaboard National
Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26, 85 N. E. 829 (1908).
4 Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619, 55 Am. Rep. 471 (1886);
Burrows v. Western Union Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86 Minn. 499, 90 N. E. 1111,
58 L. R. A. 433 (1902); Land-Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank,
196 Pa. 230, 46 A. 420, 50 L. R. A. 75 (1900); Heavey v. Commercial National
Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 P. 727 (1904) ; Jamison v. Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 P. 165
(1906).
5 Meyer v. Indiana National Bank, 27 Ind. App. 354, 61 N. E. 596 (1901) : Emporia
Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 P. 141 (1896) ; Halsey v. Bank of New York,
270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936) ; Merchant's Bank v. Metropolis Bank, 7 Daly
(N. Y.) 137 (1877); First National Bank v. American Exchange Bank, 49 App.
Div. 349, 63 N. Y. S. 58 (1905); Montgomery Garage Co. v. Liability Insurance
Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 109 A. 296, 22 A. L. R. 1224 (1920) ; Hockett Co. v. Simmonds,
84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N. E. (2d) 739 (1949).
6 That idea is expressed in Boatsman v. Stockmen's National Bank, 56 Colo. 450,
138 P. 764 (1914), and in Metzge v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 973
(1889), but both hold that the intermediary agency employed had no effect on the
drawer's intent to deal with the person of the imposter.
7 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bimetallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229, 69 P. 115
(1902) ; Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 (1937) ,
Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 A. 480 (1901); Simpson v.
Denver Ry. Co., 43 Utah 105, 134 P. 883 (1913).
8 Rossi v. National Bank, 71 Mo. App. 150 (1897). An illustration of this distinc-
tion, drawn from the law of sales, may be found in Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459
(1878).
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drawer has added a special description to the name of the payee,' or has
added a title thereto,1" the courts have been of the opinion that it was not
the imposter that was intended as the proper party to receive payment,
but the person of that description or title.
While most courts are content to construe the rights of the parties
after having determined the drawer's probable intent, at least one court
has proceeded one step farther. Having concluded that the drawer did
not intend the imposter as payee, that court proceeded to suggest that the
"imposter" rule had no application to the circumstances of the case before
it, leading to a denial of recovery as against the drawer.1 1 The statement,
however, would seem unnecessary and probably accomplishes little in
view of the fact that the same result would be reached by a determination
of the controlling issue of intent.
An argument often utilized to bolster certain of these decisions is that
the drawer, having been negligent in failing to require sufficient identifi-
cation of the imposter, is therefore estopped to deny validity of the
holder's title. The latter, having been entirely innocent throughout the
transaction, has been said to be under no duty to the drawer to determine
the genuineness of the imposter's signature.12  While one case rests solely
on this theory of negligence or estoppel,13 it would seem that the proper
theory to apply would be the "imposter" rule.
14
Can it be said, in retrospect, that the Negotiable Instruments Act
of Illinois is adequate to cope with the illustrated problem? The Appellate
Court, in the instant case, said that Section 43, which had been relied on
9 But see Bryant v. McGowan, 151 Pa. Super. 529, 30 A. (2d) 667 (1943), where
the court found the words added to the name used were merely descriptive, the
payee being described to be "Mrs. Catherine Nelson, as unremarried widow of Chas.
Nelson."
lO In Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 317, 132 N. Y. S.
1017 (1911), the payee was described as "Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Marsh."
The court found no intent to deal with the imposter, the drawer having had previous
acquaintance with a person of the name used.
11 Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 317, 132 N. Y. S. 1017
(1911).
12 McHenry v. Old Citizen's National Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395 (1911),
treated the drawer as estopped to deny validity of the imposter's endorsement. In
Hockett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N. E. (2d) 739 (1949), however, the
negligence of the holder in due course in accepting the instrument after regular
banking hours was said to affect his right of recovery. The Minnesota case of
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Central Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Minn. 425, 276 N. W. 731(1937), also treated the negligence of the drawer as sufficient to preclude a denial
of the validity of the imposter's endorsement.
13 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Central Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Minn. 425, 276 N. W. 731
(1937).
14 Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289 P. 863
(1930) ; Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank, - Mass. -, 95 N. E. (2d) 176 (1950).
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by the defendant, 15 had no application to the circumstances presented."
Forgery being thereby ruled out as a defense, there would seem to be no
other section in the statute which could have direct application. As a
result, the court was forced to fall back on common law doctrines with all
the varying distinctions thereon which call for interpretation.' Fortu-
nately, the precise situation contained the important fact of physical
presence before the drawer, making it possible to apply the majority or
so-called "imposter" rule with ease. But what of the future when an in-
termediary agency is drawn into the picture? Will the Illinois court then
add to that class of cases which draw fine distinctions of fact? Now that
the court has seen fit to declare the "imposter" rule to be applicable,
would it not be advantageous for the legislature to aid this progressive
step by an appropriate amendment or addition to the statute? If the
purpose of the statute is one designed primarily to codify the law so as
to afford protection to the holder in due course, such an amendment or ad-
dition would, without question, serve that end.
R. 0. DRTINA
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTIONS -WHETHER, IN VIEW OF ENACTMENT
OF MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS, A WIFE MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR Loss
OF CONSORTIUm BASED ON NEGLIGENT INJURY CAUSED TO HER HUSBAND--
In the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, Incorporated,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented, for
the first time since the passage of the Married Women's Act for that dis-
trict,2 with the situation of a wife attempting to recover an alleged loss of
consortium' brought about by defendant's negligence producing injury to
her husband. The husband, an employee of defendant, had been seriously
injured while at work. He applied for, and received, full compensation
for his injuries. Thereafter, the wife filed the instant action, relying on
the ground that the defendant's negligence had deprived her of her hus-
band's aid, assistance and sexual relations. The lower court dismissed
the action on defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 43. The text thereof Is set forth in note 2,
ante.
16 341 Ill. App. 85 at 90, 93 N. E. (2d) 90 at 92.
17 Further discussion of the "imposter" rule may be found in 18 B. U. L. Rev. 148,
3 Col. L. Rev. 71, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 76, and 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 387. See also
Brannon, Negotiable Instrument Law Anno., 6th Ed., 349-58.
1183 F. (2d) 811 (1950), cert. den. 340 U. S. 852, 71 S. Ct. 80, 95 L. Ed. 39
(1950).
2 D. C. Code 1940, § 30-208.
3 Bouvier, Law Dict.. Rawle's 3d Rev., defines consortium as the "right of the
husband and wife respectively to the conjugal fellowship, company, co-operation
and aid of the other."
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appealed. The Court of Appeals, in an unprecedented decision which
examined into and rejected every major contrary decision bearing on the
subject, reversed the holding and said the complaint stated an actionable
case. To reach that decision, the court examined every reason advanced
to support the unanimous refusal pronounced in other jurisdictions to
permit a suit of this character and declared every reason so examined to be
unsound.
The first such theory followed elsewhere appears to be one predicated
on the premise that the material elements of consortium are the only
elements on which a recovery can be had. From this point, courts have
deduced two reasons for concluding that the wife cannot recover for loss
of consortium. The first of these reasons rests on the ground that, while
a husband is entitled to the services of his wife, the wife in turn has no
such right to her husband's services, without which right she is not en-
titled to recover.4  A typical case in which this reasoning was said to con-
trol is to be found in the Indiana case of Boden v. Del Mar Garage where
the court argued that there was "no authority in law which gives her a
right to recover for loss of consortium alone and it is expressly held in
this state that she cannot recover . . . And the cause of action which
the husband has against one who has negligently injured him is presumed
to fully compensate him for all losses sustained, and this includes the loss
of support for his wife and family.' '
The other line of cases, illustrating the second reason, based on a
materialistic conception of consortium, reject the wife's right to recover
on the ground that any interference with the husband's duty of support,
which may fairly be said to be the converse of the wife's duty to render
services, is fully compensated for in the action brought by the husband,
at least in so far as his ability to support his wife has been diminished as
a result of his injury. It follows therefrom that to allow the wife to
recover for loss of consortium in addition would result in a double re-
covery.'
4 Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933) ; Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912) ; Stout v. Kansas City Terminal By. Co., 172 Mo.
App. 113, 157 S. W. 1019 (1913).
5 205 Ind. 59 at 70, 185 N. E. 860 at 863. Some courts have held that the Married
Women's Acts have given the wife the right to the fruits of her own services and,
as a result, the husband is no longer entitled to her services. If this reasoning is
sound, the conclusion, reached by these courts, quite properly follows that the hus-
band may no longer maintain an action for the loss of that aspect of consortium:
Marri v. Stamford Street Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911) ; Harker v. Bushouse,
254 Mich. 187, 236 N. W. 222 (1931) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821,
32 S. E. (2d) 611 (1945).
6 Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P. (2d) 1100 (1937);
Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Il1. App. 24 (1913) ; Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378.
263 N. W. 154 (1935); Gambino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App.
653, 158 S. W. 77 (1913).
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Pointing to fallacies inherent in this major line of cases, the court
in the instant case made the following statement: "The difficulty with
adhering to these authorities is that they sound in the false premise that
in these actions the loss of services is the predominant factor. This dis-
tinction lacks precedent. It is nothing more than an arbitrary separation
of the various elements of consortium devised to circumvent the logic of
allowing the wife such an action. '"7 Continuing, the court also said:
"Consortium, although it embraces within its ambit of meaning the wife's
material services, also includes love, affection, companionship, sexual rela-
tions, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic unity. And, although loss of
one or the other of these elements may be greater in the case of any one
of the several types of invasions from which consortium may be injured
there can be no rational basis for holding that in negligent invasions
suability depends on whether there is a loss of services. It is not the fact
that one or the other of the elements of consortium is injured in a par-
ticular invasion that controls the type of action which may be brought
but rather that the consortium as such has been injured at all."" In this
manner, the court dismissed that line of reasoning.
Another series of cases, while giving recognition to the existence of
other and sentimental elements implicit in the word "consortium," have,
for one or more reasons, nonetheless, refused to allow the wife to recover.
These reasons proceed on a variety of grounds. It has been said that the
injury to the wife, not being direct, is not compensable; that such injuries,
being too remote, are incapable of ascertainment; that no recovery for loss
of consortium has ever been allowed without a showing of loss of services,
any injury to the sentimental elements acting only in aggravation of
damages; and that the Married Women's Act have given no new cause
of action to the wifeY The court in the present case, answering these
varied arguments, clearly establishes the inconsistency of this line of
thought by calling attention to the fact that courts which have looked with
favor on these theories have, nevertheless, allowed the husband to recover
183 F. (2d) 811 at 813.
s Ibid., p. 814.
9 For cases in this category, see Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E.
860 (1933); Feneff v. New York Central & Hartford Ry. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E.
436 (1909); Gambino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158
S. W. 77 (1913) ; Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157
S. W. 1019 (1913) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. S. 459 (1900) ; Smith
v. Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204, L. R. A. 1916E 700, An. Cas.
1918D 206 (1915) ; Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric Co-operative, Inc., 201
Okla. 504, 207 P. (2d) 784 (1949) ; Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 81 Ore.
517, 160 P. 132 (1916).
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where the wife's injury has been due to the defendant's negligence. De-
cisions of the latter type would make it apparent that the validity of an
argument to the effect that the injury is too remote and indirect to allow a
recovery is made to turn on the sex of the injured party.10
In still other cases, courts have refused to protect the wife's interest
in such an action as this on the theory that the wife's interest in the
marital relation is not a property right, derived from bargain and sale,
but rather lies in an area into which the courts should not intrude, except
when necessity dictates that the wilful wrongdoer be punished, such as in
cases based on criminal conversation or alienation of affections. These
courts have theorized that the reason for allowing suits of that character
lies in the fact that the recovery is granted more as a form of punishment
than with thought of compensation to the injured party.1 Again, in
denying the efficacy of such reasoning, the instant court stated: "The civil
side of the court cannot permit an award of punitive damages except as
incidental to an actionable civil wrong."" The comment so made effec-
tively rebuts the argument that suits of the type here under consideration
can be, and are to be, maintained solely for the purpose of punishing the
wrongdoer.
The court deciding the instant case did not merely rely on inade-
quacies in the opposing arguments. Having shown the inconsistencies in
the aforementioned contrary theories, it turned to affirmative factors sup-
porting a recovery by the wife. In that regard, the court said that "logic,
reason and right are in favor of the position we are now taking. The
medieval concepts of the marriage relation to which other jurisdictions
have reverted in order to reach the results which have been handed to us
as evidence of the law have long since ceased to have any meaning. It
can hardly be said that a wife has less of an interest in the marriage rela-
tion than does the husband or in these modern times that a husband renders
services of such a different character to the family and household that they
must be measured by a standard of such uncertainty that the law cannot
10 Along much the same line, it might be noted that courts have allowed the bus-
band to recover, in suits based on criminal conversation, even though the husband
has condoned the conduct and no loss of services has occurred, the recovery being
based on sentimental elements alone. The fallacy of forbidding a similar suit to
the wife should be equally obvious. The injury to the sentimental areas of con-
sortium would be the same whether the injury arose from an intentional act, as is
required in actions for criminal conversation or alienation of affections, or from
negligent injury.
11 See Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912) ; Goldman v. Cohen,
30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. S. 459 (1900).
12 183 F. (2d) 811 at 816. See also Johnson v. Luhman, 340 Il1. App. 625, 92 N. E.
(2d) 486 (1950).
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estimate any loss thereof . . . Under such circumstances it would be
judicial fiat for us to say that a wife may not have an action for loss of
consortium due to negligence."13
It was not without some judicial support for the view so expressed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of Hipp v. E. I. Dupont
DeNemours Company,' had held that a wife possessed a right to recover
for a loss of consortium occasioned by a negligent injury to her husband,
only to reverse itself, however, a short time later. Dissenting justices in
two other jurisdictions have pointed up the inadequacies in the stand taken
by the majority view, 5 but the most recent support for the proposition
sustained herein is to be found in the case of McDade v. West."8 It is true
that the judges of the Georgia Appellate Court considering that case were
equally divided on the question of whether or not a wife should be allowed
such a recovery, 1 7 but three of the judges subscribed to the view that the
''wrong" is a direct wrong to the valuable interests of the wife, whether
intentional or not, the damage for which the husband cannot sue, and in
these days of enlightment, her rights should be recognized and enforced.""'
Far more important than the limited extent of acceptable authority is
the eminently sound reasoning which underlies the present decision. It
is axiomatic that the law, insofar as is possible, should give a remedy for
every violated right. It is also a well accepted proposition that, since the
adoption of the Married Women's Acts, both the husband and wife have
equal rights before the law, at least in all other areas.' 9 Keeping these
statements in mind, it is only necessary to recognize the conceptualistic
13 183 F. (2d) 811 at 819. This attitude has been reflected by others. See Vernier,
American Family Law (Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California,
1935), Vol. 3, § 158; Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 Col. L. Rev. 651
(1930); Holbrook, "The Change in the Meaning of Consortium," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1923); and note in 9 Ind. L. J. 182.
14182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 18 A. L. R. 873 (1921). The case was overruled by
the decision in Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307, 37
A. L. R. 889 (1925).
15 See dissenting opinion of Bond, J., in Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208
S. W. 462 (1919), and that of Scudder, J., in Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div.
769, 270 N. Y. S. 534 (1934).
16 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S. E. (2d) 299 (1949).
17 The division necessitated affirmation of a trial court refusal to permit recovery.
18 80 Ga. App. 481 at 486, 56 S. E. (2d) 299 at 302.
19 This was, of course, not true under the common law because of the disabilities
which attached to the woman at the time of marriage. BI. Com., Book 3, § 143,
states: "We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution
of either the relation itself, or at least to the advantages accruing therefrom;
while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason
for which may be this: that the inferior hath no property in the company, care or
assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior;
and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury." Such reasoning is, of course,
no longer applicable in view of modern statutes on the subject.
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unity which is a part and parcel of the word "consortium" to appreciate
the validity of the court's findings in the instant case. Consortium, al-
though consisting of several distinct rights running in favor of the husband
and wife, is, in and of itself, a completely independent right. The proper
recognition of consortium as an independent right leads to a further recog-
nition that an injury to any one of the several component parts of the
right of consortium constitutes a proper ground upon which recovery may
be had. The refusal of the majority of the courts to recognize this basic
fact has been the greatest stumbling block, heretofore, in the path of allow-
ing a recovery in cases of this nature. It should, now, be removed.
There is, however, one danger that must be avoided. The danger of
allowing a double recovery is, without question, a strong possibility; but
it is one that can be avoided. The possibility of a double recovery may be
circumvented by appropriate instruction confiiiing the jury to a considera-
tion solely of those elements of consortium which are claimed injured by
the defendant's conduct. If, for example, the husband has already re-
covered adequate damages to compensate for the loss of his ability to
support his wife, jury consideration may be limited to the remaining in-
jured and uncompensated portions of the wife's right to consortium. True,
it may be difficult to measure, in monetary terms, the extent of the injury
suffered by the invasion of these other elements, but this should not con-
stitute ground for refusing to allow a recovery. If the damage is certain,
the fact that the extent of the damage is uncertain is not enough to bar a
recovery.20
The desirability of having courts in other jurisdictions follow the path
marked out by the present case is self-evident. It has been said that a
"rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and
was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be
abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of
the rule would do violence to the social conscience. "21 So apt is this
statement to the present situation that, with the clear and forceful opinion
of the court in the instant case to guide them, it should be expected that
other courts will follow suit and abandon earlier views. Those views, seen
from the standpoint of modern enlightment, represent at best nothing more
than archaic custom.
A. L. WYMAN, JR.
20 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 51 S. Ct.
248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1931).
21 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,
1946), p. 136.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS FOR THE PERIOD WHEN THE PLANT IS CLOSED FOR VACATION-The
final toot of the factory whistle, signalling the cessation of plant operations
for a vacation period, and the subsequent exodus of employees to their
local unemployment compensation offices, has produced a flurry of deci-
sions evaluating the right of such workers to share in the benefits provided
under various state unemployment compensation acts. Representative
of these cases are the two Michigan decisions in Renown Stove Company v.
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission" and Hubbard v. Mich-
igan Unemployment Compensation Commission.
2
in the first of these cases, the employer laid off the employees for an
indefinite period. They immediately began drawing upon their unemploy-
ment benefits but, as the employer had designated the time between July
5 and July 18 as vacation time and had issued "pay" for this period, the
employer protested against the simultaneous issuance of benefits. After
administrative action had confirmed the employees' right to the benefits,
the employer appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan. That court,
after investigating the underlying sentiment which stimulated the enact-
ment of unemployment compensation legislation and finding that "the ob-
jective sought to be gained is protection against evils incident to invol-
untary unemployment and the fostering of social and economic security
by the payment of benefits to individuals who have suffered loss of pay
resulting from involuntary unemployment," 3 declared that certain of the
employees were incapacitated from receiving benefits for the stated period
but that others were entitled thereto. The court found that the legisla-
tive purpose had been codified in a provision of the Michigan statute which
disqualified an individual for benefit in any week with respect to which
he received payments in the form of "vacation with pay". 4  To discover
whether the checks disbursed by the employer constituted a "vacation with
pay," the court had recourse to the union contracts under which the em-
ployees were working and discovered that, under one contract, the period
"from July 5, 1948, to July 18, 1948" was expressly designated as a
vacation period.5  The contract covering the rest of the employees pro-
vided that the vacation was to be taken at a time to be mutually agreed
1328 Mich. 438, 44 N. W. (2d) 1 (1950).
2 328 Mich. 444, 44 N. W. (2d) 4 (1950).
3 328 Mich. 438 at 439, 44 N. W. (2d) 1 at 3.
4 Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 421.29(1) (d) (2).
5 Certain of the employees in the Renown Stove Company case were members of
the International Stove Mounters' Union. The contract with that union contained
the clause in question. Its members were the ones held disqualified as to benefits.
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upon but permitted the employees to receive from forty to eighty hours'
pay in lieu of a vacation."
Employees covered by the first contract were held incapacitated from
receiving unemployment benefits for they had received a "vacation with
pay" within the meaning of the statute. Those under the latter contract
were held to have an option to take a vacation, the exercise of which could
not be dictated by any arbitrary and unilateral action on the part of the
employer. As the checks tendered to these employees could not be con-
nected with the period in dispute, they were permitted to recover pro-
vided they met other eligibility tests laid down by the statute.
The problem and solution in the second case ran parallel to the first.
The company there, in the face of a refusal of the union to agree to a vaca-
tion plan, 7 closed the plant for a fixed period. The union contract pro-
vided for "compensation in lieu of a vacation" at the employee's option,
entitling him to payment whether or not he availed himself of a respite
from work. In the light of such a contract, the court held that the em-
ployees became involuntarily unemployed when the employer closed the
plant and were, therefore, eligible to receive unemployment compensation
benefits.8
The inherent purpose of the various unemployment compensation acts
is one designed to alleviate the physical and economic suffering likely to be
visited upon an individual who loses the security guaranteed by his
weekly pay check through involuntary unemployment.' It follows, there-
fore, that an applicant should not be entitled to unemployment benefits
where, although he has been forced to leave the work harness for a
period of time, he has received remuneration for that period. Where an
employee is forced, by an imposition of the employer's will, to take a
vacation but receives an amount of money from the latter, the character
of that payment will have much to do with whether or not compensation
is allowable. If the sum can be termed "wage" or "salary" or, whatever
its designation, is connected with the layoff period, additional compensa-
6These employees were members of the International Molders and Foundry
Workers Union.
7 Vacation periods had formerly been staggered throughout the year but the
employer, in the interest of increased plant efficiency, sought a simultaneous vaca-
tion period for all help. The union indicated a preference for a continuation of the
former plan.
8 The union contract conferred vacation benefits only on those who had worked
for a stated minimum period. As to the right of a new employee, one who had not
been employed for a sufficient time to receive a paid vacation, to seek unemployment
compensation benefits when temporarily forced out of work by a vacation shut-
down of the plant pursuant to the union contract calling for paid vacations, see
Claim of Rakowski, 276 App. Div. 625, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 309 (1950).
9 American Central Mfg. Corp. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division, - Ind. - at -, 88 N. E. (2d) 256 at 258 (1949).
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tion should not be obtainable. 10 On the other hand, if the remuneration
has no nexus to the vacation period, the party should be entitled to
benefits provided other statutory requirements are satisfied. In order to
determine the nature or character of the payments, then, the employment
contract itself must be subjected to scrutiny.
Where the contract requires the granting of a vacation period but the
right of the employer to specify the period of such work holiday has
been retained by him, or where the employer and employees have designated
a specific non-work period, cases prior to the instant decisions have been
unanimous in denying to the employee the privilege of simultaneous
receipt of both unemployment benefits and vacation compensation."
Obviously, such a result is correct and proper. The issuance and delivery
of pay checks in such situations can have no other office than to provide
remuneration for the layoff period. As the employee receives a payment
from his employer which is definitely connected with the period of
unemployment, he has no right to additional compensation. The reasoning
of the Michigan court in the first cited case, at least as to those individuals
employed under the first contract mentioned, is so obviously right that
the decision, in this respect, provides little more than added weight to
the existing law.
The other contracts involved in the instant cases, however, did not
force the employees to take a respite from work. On the contrary, the
employment agreements allowed them the choice of working for the
full year with the right to receive "compensation in lieu of a vacation."
Under this situation, the Michigan court found that a forced layoff, even
though accompanied by the issuance of checks, did not deprive the em-
ployees of unemployment benefits for the work holiday. It was reasoned
that since the employer had contracted away his right to declare a vaca-
tion period, the payments received by his employees could have no
connection with the period of unemployment and had to be treated as
some form of bonus. Such being the case, there was a period of involuntary
10 The drafters of the various state acts have expressed the idea in different, yet
not contradictory, language. Some define the term "employment" expressly as in-
cluding periods of vacation with pay, or leave -with pay: Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann.
1933 (1951 Replace.), § 52-1532(a) (f). Others describe "total unemployment" as
that period with respect to which no wages are payable and during which no
services are performed. The word "wages," in turn, is defined to cover every form
of remuneration, including salaries, commissions, and bonuses: N. H. Rev. Laws
1942, Ch. 218, § 1, para. N (1) and P. In Illinois, the terms "unemployment" and
"wages" carry similar definitions: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 218(k) and
§ 218(g).
11 Kelly v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 136 Conn. 482, 72 A.(2d) 54 (1950) ; American Central Mfg. Corp. v. Review Board of Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division, - Ind. -, 88 N. E. (2d) 256 (1949) ; Wellman v. Riley,
Com'r of Labor, 95 N. H. 502, 67 A. (2d) 428 (1949) ; Hamlin v. Coolerator Co.,
227 Minn. 437, 35 N. W. (2d) 616 (1949).
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unemployment without the required contractual compensation, thereby
permitting access to payments under the state statute.
Even where the employee receives no check from the employer for
the vacation period, he may still be precluded from unemployment benefits.
The unemployment insurance acts generally prevent the payment, or in
some jurisdictions the immediate payment, of benefits where the unem-
ployment is produced by the employee's conduct in voluntarily leaving
work without good cause. 12  Clearly, where the closing of the plant is
brought about by the arbitrary action of the employer alone, this segment
of the law cannot negate the employee's right to benefits. Where, however,
a union contract exists which consents to the closing of the plant for
vacation purposes, statutory sections of the kind in question may become
operable. It has been held, for example, that if the individual, acting
through his union negotiators, voluntarily consents to a leave of absence,
he is not entitled to benefits notwithstanding the fact that under the
union contract he would not be entitled to any idle-time payment from the
employer."3 Reasoning of that character ought to be equally applicable
to those instances where the employee consents to the work stoppage for
the purpose of enjoying a vacation.
Notice should also be taken of another general requirement to be
found in unemployment insurance laws, one which requires that the
individual must be available for work in order to be eligible for benefits.14
One aspect of the decision in the Connecticut case of Kelly v. Adminis-
trator, Unemployment Compensation Act," a case involving a situation
wherein the employer closed the plant for a short holiday period and
tendered payment to the employees pursuant to the employment contract,
indicates that a denial of benefits would be proper upon the basis that
the workers were unavailable for work. That result was achieved on
the ground that, according to the court, no one could be found who
would hire the employees for the balance of the holiday period, con-
sidering the time it would take to process a registration of the idle
employees for work during that week. The court commented upon the
fact that it could "hardly be said that they were in the labor market
for so short a period. '16 Inasmuch as the Connecticut statute treats
an individual as not being unemployed if he receives a payment by way
12 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 223(a).
13 Moen v. Director of Division of Unemployment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N. E.
(2d) 779, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 429 (1949) ; Mattey v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A. (2d) 429 (1949); In re Buffelen Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 32 Wash. (2d) 205, 201 P. (2d) 194 (1948).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 222(c).
15 136 Conn. 482, 72 A. (2d) 54 (1950).
16 136 Conn. 482 at 486, 72 A. (2d) 54 at 56.
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of compensation for loss of wages from his employer, 7 and as payment
clearly existed under the facts of that case, it would appear that the
rationale adopted was both unnecessary and unfortunate. The fact of
unemployment ought not be affected by the assumption that, at the end
of the "vacation" period, the employee might be recalled to work. For
that matter, it is not entirely impossible that another employer might
seek employees even for so short a period. Anyway, the statutory test
merely requires that the employee demonstrate that he is "available,"
that is that he will accept comparable work in the locality if it is offered
to him. It is doubtful, then, if the Connecticut court would fall back
on this rationale if the employer, without the employee's acquiescence,
were to cease operations for a "vacation" period without tendering pay,
yet promised to resume activity at the end of the period. Too much
reliance, therefore, should not be placed on that decision.
While the addition of the instant cases to the body of existing law
on the subject creates no conflict, and while both decisions appear sound,
it is clear that all of the problems relating to payment of unemployment
benefits for inactivity during vacation periods have not yet been solved.
A. KATZ
NEGLIGENCE - ACTS OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE -
WHETHER OR NOT AN ARTIFICIALLY CREATED WATER-FILLED EXCAVATION
CONSTITUTES AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-The Supreme Court of Indiana,
through the medium of the case of Plotzki v. Standard Oil Company of
Indiana,' had presented to it, for determination, a problem of not in-
frequent occurrence but which has often created a good deal of perplexity.
The case was one in which a parent sued to recover damages for the
wrongful death of the plaintiff's eleven-year old son. The defendant
had caused an excavation to be dug on certain realty owned by it within
municipal limits, which excavation was unguarded and located about
150 feet from a public street. The hole was visible to pedestrians and
was also frequented, to the knowledge of the defendant, by numerous
children while at play. The floor of the excavation was unevenly graded,
having drop-offs and hidden holes, some as much as eight feet in depth.
The pit became filled with rain water which, becoming murky in character,
concealed the hidden holes. The plaintiff's intestate waded in the pool
so formed and was drowned when he fell into one of the holes. The
plaintiff attempted to utilize the attractive nuisance doctrine as the
17 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, § 7508(4) (a).
1 - Ind. -, 92 N. E. (2d) 632 (1950). Emmert, Ch. J., and Gilkison, J.. each
wrote a dissenting opinion.
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basis for her suit, but defendant demurred on the ground the facts did
not state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
Upon direct appeal, a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling, stating that a pool, pond, lake, stream or other body
of water does not, by the overwhelming weight of authority, constitute
an attractive nuisance. The majority also refused to agree that the
presence of sharp drop-offs and deep holes in artificially constructed
pools of water constituted traps or hidden dangers for which the defendant
could be held liable.
The "turntable" doctrine, one later to acquire the name of "attractive
nuisance," was originally formulated in this country in the case of
Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company v. Stout,2 a case wherein an
infant was permitted to recover damages for injuries sustained notwith-
standing the fact that the infant was then trespassing. The court there
stated it to be a question for the jury to determine as to whether or not
the defendant's act in maintaining the instrumentality was likely to
attract children. If so, a duty was thereby imposed on the property
owner to prevent harm to infant trespassers; a duty not previously known
in law. The doctrine so formulated has been defined, in Pekin v. Mc-
Mahon,3 to be one creating an obligation to use reasonable care where
"land of a private owner is in a thickly populated or settled city adjacent
to a public street or alley and he has upon it, or suffers to be upon it,
dangerous machinery, or a dangerous pit or pond of water, or any other
dangerous agency, at a point thereon near such public street or alley,
of such a character as to be attractive to children of tender years, in-
capable of exercising ordinary care, and he is aware or has notice of its
attractions for children of that class."'
One would normally assume that bodies of water, even though
hazardous, would constitute such an allurement for children as to become
attractive nuisances. Courts, however, have historically held that natural
water hazards are not within the scope of the doctrine' although the reasons
advanced have not been consistent. From absence of liability for natural
water hazards, it has been an easy step to excuse the owner for the
consequences flowing from an artificial accumulation of water. Legally
speaking, the arguments may sound strange, but they bear evidence of
expediency. Some learned courts have displayed a remarkably business-
like viewpoint in holding that it would be impracticable to guard the
284 U. S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1874).
3 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1895).
4 154 Ill. 141 at 148, 39 N. E. 484 at 485.
5 Peers v. Pierre, 336 Ill. App. 134, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 (1949) ; Wood v. Consumers
Co., 334 Ill. App. 530, 79 N. E. (2d) 826 (1949). See additional citations in 8
A. L. R. (2d) 1262.
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water hazard." In Sullivan v. Huidekoper,7 for example, the court used
colorful language to the effect that every "man who has been brought
up with the freedom allowed to American boys knows that you might
as well try to dam the Nile with bulrushes as to keep boys away from
ponds, pools or other bodies of water."" For want of better reason to deny
liability, some courts have been induced to disregard the value of life
and have advanced a morbid consideration based on a mathematic pro-
portion between the small number of deaths in relation to the large
number of boys who visit ponds or bodies of water.' Others, acting as
amateur psychologists, have indicated that it is the nature of boys to
seek out bodies of water so that the expense of securing the same from
invasion would be astronomical in comparison to the utility derived from
such water.'
It has been an accepted fact, in a few jurisdictions, that water may
be considered to be patently dangerous, but these courts have refused to
transfer the burden of the duty of protecting the infant from the parent
to the property owner on whose land the water is situated. These courts
presuppose that it is the duty of the parent to acquaint the child with
the patent danger of water and of the possibility of drowning therein.1
Such a duty is regarded as preventative on the part of the parent rather
than a curative one resting on the property owner. As candidly stated in
the Minnesota case of Stendal v. Boyd,' 2 if an owner "must guard an
artificial pond on his premises, so as to prevent injury to children who may
be attracted to it, he must, on the same principle, guard a natural pond;
and, if the latter, why not a brook or creek, for all water is equally alluring
to children 3
Being aware of the danger which would be created by fixing unlim-
ited liability on the land owner, courts have nevertheless devised a method
6Melandez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. (2d) 741, 68 P. (2d) 971 (1937);
Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. Cas. 154, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (D. C., 1906);
Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (1914).
727 App. Cas. 154, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (1906).
8 27 App. Cas. 154 at 163-4.
9 Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P. 441, L. R. A.
1916D 443 (1916); Holland v. Lanarkshire Middle Ward Dist. Council, [1909]
Sc. L. Rep. 1142.
10 Cobb v. Lowe Mfg. Co., 227 Ala. 456, 150 So. 687 (1933) ; Emond v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (1914).
11 Luallen v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182 (1938);
Peters v. Bowman, 15 Cal. 345, 47 P. 113, 56 Am. St. Rep. 106 (1896) ; King v.
Simon Bruck Co., 42 Cal. App. (2d) 586, 126 P. (2d) 628 (1942) ; McCall v. McCal-
lie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933) ; McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 16 La.
App. 234, 133 So. 524 (1931).
1273 Minn. 53, 75 N. W. 735, 42 L. R. A. 288, 72 Am. St. Rep. 597 (1898). The
complaint had been sustained in 67 Minn. 279, 69 N. W. 899 (1897).
13 73 Minn. 53 at 55, 75 N. W. 735.
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of allowing for some degree of liability where water is artificially gathered
on the land, yet limiting the scope of that liability. The vehicle by which
this has been accomplished has been through the introduction of an element
of unusual danger existing about the water hazard. Such unusual danger
has been considered to be an additional allurement, turning the presence
of water into an attractive nuisance. In the Illinois case of Peers v.
Pierre,14 a case similar on its facts to the instant one, the court denied re-
covery by saying that the "weight of authority is to the effect that the
attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds where there is no
unusiul danger.'1 5 But it did refer to Pekin v. McMahon,16 one of the
leading cases in which liability has been established because of the pres-
ence of an unusual danger. The danger there took the form of a raft-like
log floating on the pond. The extra hazard necessary has been satisfied
by a floating sidewalk ;17 by floating sawdust in the pool ;"' by a spoil bank
with sand adjacent to the pool;19 and by a plank walk with access to a
pumphouse.Y°
Absent such an unusual danger, recovery has generally been denied
in the so-called "excavation" cases. In the Texas case of Banker v. Me-
Laughlin,21 however, an infant was drowned in an excavation filled with
water. The excavation was located in a homesite, in close proximity to
dwellings wherein lived numerous families with children. No unusual
danger was evident beyond the presence of accumulated water, but the
court was persuaded to allow a recovery, utilizing the attractive nuisance
doctrine as the basis therefor. It stressed three points to justify the re-
sult. In the first place, the body of water served no practical purpose and
possessed no value or utility. Second, the water hazard could have been
abated or removed at a nominal cost. The third point turned on the
landowner 's knowledge of the presence of children on the premises. The
accumulation of these three was said to be enough to impose liability.
That decision marked a departure from prior Texas holdings, but the views
so expressed have found favor in only a few other jurisdictions."
The Indiana court, in the instant case, may be said to have resolved
14 336 Ill. App. 134, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 (1948).
15 336 Ill. App. 134 at 138, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 at 22. Italics added.
16 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1895).
17 Linnberg v. City of Rock Island, 136 fI1. App. 495 (1907). The same case, on
subsequent appeal, appears in 157 Ill. App. 527 (1910).
18 Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 215 F. 8, L. R. A. 1915A 731 (1914).
19 Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 54 S. Ct. 487, 78 L. Ed. 882 (1934).
2
o Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933).
21146 Tex. 434, 208 S. W. (2d) 843, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 1231 (1948).
2 2 Peters v. City of Tampa, 115 Fla. 666, 155 So. 854 (1934) ; Altus v. Mullihan,
98 Okla. 12, 23 P. 851 (1924) ; Pigford v. Cherokee Falls Mfg. Co., 124 S. C. 389,
117 S. E. 419 (1923).
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the problem correctly, if correctness is to be measured by the weight of
authority. The fact remains, however, that it is undeniable that certain
bodies of water are hazardous to children who may be attracted by them.
It may be better, for that reason, to have these cases decided on their in-
dividual facts rather than by attempting to fit them into arbitrary cate-
gories. Certainly, the Indiana court has not contributed to that end, while
the Texas court, although not deciding correctly in view of the weight of
authority, has shown an adventurous spirit which might well stimulate
thought.
If practicability is to be the keynote, in working out a definition of
a water hazard as an attractive nuisance, would it not be more practicable
to permit the jury, rather than a court on demurrer, to evaluate the sev-
eral factors? It might be remembered that to be practical is not always
to be wise. But, for that matter, to be legal is not always to be just. A
happy medium, however, may lie at the point where legal and practical
approaches unite in the just and equitable disposition of cases.
E. F. NOWAK
WILLS--CONSTRUCTION-WVHETHER OR NOT A LEGATEE GRANTED AN
ANNUITY BY WILL MAY ELECT TO TAKE THE CAPITAL SUM IN LIEU THER_-
or-The problem before the court in the recent Illinois case of In re Her-
rick's Estate1 turned about the question as to whether or not a legatee
could elect to take the capital sum in lieu of an annuity which had been
provided for her under the will of the testatrix. ' It appeared that the
testatrix had received literature from the American Bible Society explain-
ing a plan by which persons desiring to help the society, and to further
its missionary work, might do so by purchasing annuity contracts from it.
Under these contracts, the named annuitant would receive a stipulated
certain amount for life with reversion of the principal, at the annuitant 's
death, going to the society. Testatrix had, during her lifetime, purchased
several such annuities with the avowed intention of helping the society
in its work. By her will, she directed her executor to purchase another
annuity from the same society for the benefit of her cousin. The executor,
after the death of the testatrix, which was soon followed by the death of
the annuitant-legatee, petitioned the probate court for directions con-
cerning the purchase of the annuity. Objection was made by the executor
of the estate of the cousin. He claimed the principal sum in lieu of the
annuity. On appeal from an order overruling the objection and direct-
ing the executor to pay the fund to the society, the circuit court reversed
1 Sub nom. American Bible Society v. Chase, 340 Ill. App. 548, 92 N. E. (2d) 332
(19.50).
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the judgment. The Appellate Court for the Second District, passing on
the question for the first time in this state, in turn reversed the circuit
court and remanded the case to the probate court with direction to pro-
ceed as originally ordered.
Cases dealing with testamentary direction to purchase or provide an
annuity generally fall into one of three classes. Under the first, the will
contains an absolute direction to make the purchase. The second group
includes cases where the will contains a gift over of the residue, after
payment of the annuity, to a designated remainderman. The third treats
with a direction to purchase an annuity from a named corporation for
the benefit of a designated annuitant for life with the understanding that
any unexpended portion of the principal is to remain in the hands of the
corporation.
As to the first class, an uninterrupted line of English cases has held
that a bequest of money to be used in the purchase of an annuity gives to
the legatee an unqualified right to elect to take the money itself, so as
to put the annuitant in a position where he can insist that the annuity
shall not be bought.2  There is consistency in this reasoning 3 for it is
based on the accepted premise that, as the legatee may sell the particular
object as soon as it has been bought for him, the law should not require
the doing of a nugatory act.4 The first American case, that of Reid v.
Brown,5 adopted much the same view. The action was one to construe a
will directing the purchase of an annuity for the benefit of a named per-
son but with a direction to give the money to certain designated charitable
organizations in the event the beneficiary had predeceased the testator.
The annuitant, who had survived, elected to take the principal as a lump
sum in preference to the annuity which might have been purchased there-
with. The court, holding that she had that right, stated that: "Where an
absolute and unqualified annuity is given, with instructions to invest a
sum sufficient to purchase the annuity, the annuitant may elect to take the
capital sum instead of having it invested for the purpose of producing
the annuity. "6
The fundamental principle which underlies this view, one which treats
2 Ford v. Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 51 Eng. Rep. 1050 (1853); Kerr v. Middlesex
Hospital, 2 DeG., M. & G. 576, 42 Eng. Rep. 996 (1852) ; Stokes v. Heron, 12 Cl. &
Fin. 161, 8 Eng. Rep. 1361 (1845); Dawson v. Hearn, 1 Russ. & M. 606, 39 Eng.
Rep. 232 (1831) ; Bayley v. Bishop, 9 Ves. jun. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803) ; Barnes
v. Rowley, 3 Ves. jun. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797) ; Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wms.
308, 24 Eng. Rep. 743 (1725). See also Jarman, Wills, 7th Ed., Vol. 2, p. 1109.
3 Scott, Trusts, Vol. 3, § 346, p. 1898. See also note in 41 Mich. L. Rev. 276.
4 2 Am. Jur., Annuities, § 33.
554 Misc. 481, 106 N. Y. S. 27 (1907).
6 54 Misc. 481 at 482, 106 N. Y. S. 27 at 27. See also Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
2d Ed., Vol. 2, p. 399.
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the annuity provision as no more than one providing for a transferable
legacy, has been repeatedly followed in Massachusetts and New York.'
In fact, the insistent refusal to follow the evident intention of the testator
probably reached its peak in one New York case, that of In re Cole's
Estate," for the court there, in substance, stated the intention of the
testator did not count as he should have known the law on the subject
when he drew up his will. That attitude probably led to the passage of a
statute in New York, one which forbids any right of election if there is a
direction to purchase an annuity from an insurance company unless the
will gives express recognition to such a right.9 Despite this statute, a New
York court, applying a strict construction thereto, has still permitted a
right of election where the direction is one to purchase the annuity from
some one other than an insurance company.10
In contrast, a larger number of American jurisdictions have refused
to adopt the English view than have accepted it.1" In the Ohio case of
Feiler v. Klein,12 for example, the court was faced with a similar problem
arising under a direction in a will for the purchase of an annuity for the
life of the beneficiary. It decided that the annuitant had no right to
elect to take the principal in lieu thereof because it was said that the in-
tention of the testator should control. When the will was construed as the
court supposed the testator understood it, it revealed a purpose to lay
out a fixed and certain amount in the purchase of the annuity but con-
templated that the benefit thereof should accrue to the annuitant for life
and not in one lump sum. In answer to the claim that the making of the
purchase would be rendered nugatory by the annuitant 's sale of the
annuity contract, the court pointed out that the annuitant would find a
7 Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N. E. 476 (1911); In re Cole's Estate, 219
N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785 (1916) ; In re Fisher's Estate, 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S.(2d) 140 (1941); In re Proctor's Will, 235 App. Div. 6, 255 N. Y. S. 722 (1932) ;
In re Fuller's Ex'rs, 227 App. Div. 801, 237 N. Y. S. 207 (1929) ; In re Bartuch's
Will, 225 App. Div. 773, 232 N. Y. S. 36 (1928) ; In re Foster's Estate, 174 Misc.
933, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1940); In re Oakley's Will, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. S.
306 (1931). See also In re Maybaum's Estate, 296 N. Y. 201, 71 N. E. (2d) 865
(1947).
8 219 N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785 (1916).
9 Thompson, Consol. Laws N. Y. 1939, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 47-b, Decedent Estate Law,
states: "If a person hereafter dying shall direct in his will the purchase from an
insurance company of an annuity, the person or persons to whom the income
thereof shall be directed to be paid shall not have the right to elect to take the
capital sum directed to be used for such purpose in lieu of such annuity except
to the extent the will expressly provides for such right . . ."
10 See In re Fisher, 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 140 (1941).
11 The problem appears to have arisen in only five states in addition to Massa-
chusetts and New York. The opposite view is illustrated by In re Lawrence's
Estate, 17 Cal. (2d) 1, 108 P. (2d) 893 (1941) ; Ketcham v. International Trust
Co., 117 Colo. 559, 192 P. (2d) 426 (1948) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 238 Iowa 1221,
30 N. W. (2d) 164 (1947) ; Bedell v. Colby, 94 N. H. 384, 54 A. (2d) 161 (1947);
Feiler v. Klein, 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
12 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
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sale difficult as the face value of the contract would be uncertain. Ex-
cept as an agreement might be worked out between the annuitant and the
holder of the fund for a commutation thereof into, and payment of, its
present worth, the majority reasoning is persuasive and reflects the sounder
attitude that the intention of the testator should control.
The second class of cases deals with directions calling for the purchase
of an annuity for life with a gift over of the residue to a designated remain-
derman. Again, the English decisions would seem to favor the right of the
annuitant to elect to take the capital sum in lieu of the annuity, even to
the disappointment of the remainderman's expectations," but the Ameri-
can courts would appear to be in complete harmony on a rule to the effect
that where there is a gift over the annuitant has no right of election.14
Whatever the quality of the reasoning behind the English view, it would
seem more nearly to be the intention of the testator, from the presence of
the gift over, that the annuitant should have no more than a life interest.
If the remainderman has a vested interest in the principal sum, or in the
residue thereof, the annuitant certainly should not be allowed to destroy
that interest.
Between these two views lies the third group, one into which the in-
stant case falls. Herein are found the cases dealing with the purchase
of annuities from a named company for the purpose of paying stipulated
sums to the beneficiary for life but with the remainder, if any, staying
in the hands of the company selling the contract. The first American
case in this category also arose in New York. In the case of In re Geis,'5
the testator, who had been active in missionary work, made a will direct-
ing the purchase of annuities from certain missionary societies for the
benefit of named legatees. These legatees claimed a right to elect to take
the principal in lieu of the annuity provision but the court refused to
permit any such election. The court considered it to be the intention of
the testator that the beneficiaries were to receive what was, in essence, a life
estate with a remainder over to the societies to receive the unexpended por-
tions of the principal at the death of the annuitants, even though such
purpose was not expressly stated. The purpose being, in reality, to make
a gift to the societies of the residue after payment of the annuities, the
annuitants were denied the right to destroy this vested interest in the
principal. That holding has been followed in later cases arising in Ohio' 6
and Maryland, 17 and is now accepted into the law of Illinois.
13 See Timins v. Stockhouse, 27 Beav. 434, 54 Eng. Rep. 170 (1858).
14 In re Oakley's Will, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. S. 306 (1931) ; In re Lejie's Estate,
181 Pa. 416, 37 A. 554 (1897).
15 167 Misc. 357, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 770 (1938).
16 Feller v. Klein, 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
17 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Gilbert v. Finlay College, - Md. -, 74 A.
(2d) 36 (1950), reached a similar conclusion on somewhat similar facts to the
ones in the instant case.
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When the particular plan of disposition utilized by the testator in the
instant case is borne in mind, the results achieved are nothing if not
eminently fitting. A testator, intent on providing a modicum of support
for the natural objects of his bounty, but nothing more, ought to be assured
that the unneeded portions of his estate will eventually inure to his fa-
vored charity without the necessity of interposing a trust to support the
ultimate distribution. The instant holding provides that assurance.
B. BERGER
RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DECISIONS--WHETHER A REQUEST FOR A SECOND REHEARING IS
NECESSARY WHERE THE FIRST REHEARING RESULTED IN A MODIFICATION OF
THE ORIGINAL ORDER-Alton Railroad Company v. Illinois Commerce Com-
mission1 involves one aspect of the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine which has not heretofore been decided in this jurisdiction. In
1933, certain railroads furnishing switching services to industries in Bloom-
ington, Illinois, eliminated from their switching districts various concerns
operating in the locality.' Subsequently the Bloomington Association of
Commerce and several of the firms directly affected filed a complaint with
the Illinois Commerce Commission alleging the above facts and requesting
that the industries be restored to the district and thus obtain the benefit of
the reasonable switching rates applicable thereto. Extensive hearings were
held and finally, in 1940, the Commission entered an order dismissing the
complaint and upholding the legality of the action taken by the railroads.
An appeal was pursued in accordance with the Act 3 and the Circuit Court
of McLean County set aside the decision, remanding the case to the Com-
mission. This judgment was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. 4 Upon
the remandment the Commission conducted more hearings and in 1945
rendered a ruling requiring the railroads to restore their switching dis-
tricts as originally established, thus reinstating the eliminated firms, and
also to fix a connecting line switching rate in accordance with specifications
included in the order. A rehearing was granted at which time both parties
were permitted to present additional testimony and exhibits. Thereafter,
in 1947, a second order was entered incorporating by reference its 1945
predecessor but modifying it to allow the railroads (1) to take advantage
of a statewide increase in freight rates which had become effective sub-
sequent to its entry and (2) more time in which to comply with the Com-
mission's mandate. The railroads still being dissatisfied, appealed to the
Circuit Court of McLean County at which time the Commission filed a
motion to dismiss, urging that the court did not have jurisdiction. It was
1407 Ill. 202, 95 N. E. (2d) 76 (1950).
2 This action forced those industries to pay a higher rate for the delivery of
freight to and from their loading facilities.
3 The Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 72, sets out
the procedure to be utilized in obtaining a judicial review of the Commerce Com-
mission decisions. This procedure has not been supplanted by the Illinois Ad-
ministrative Review Act since, as yet, Commerce Commission orders have not been
brought within its scope.
4 Alton Railroad Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 382 Ill. 478, 48
N. E. (2d) 381 (1943).
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argued that since the railroads failed to request a rehearing subsequent to
the entry of the 1947 order before appealing, a procedure which is re-
quired by the Act,' they had no standing in court. The trial court denied
the motion but affirmed the Commission's decision on its merits. The rail-
roads appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, and upon the request of the
Attorney-General appearing in behalf of the Commission that tribunal re-
versed the lower court and remanded with directions to grant the Commis-
sion's motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to request a second rehear-
ing.
In order to provide for effective and orderly administrative process
the courts have adopted the attitude that until an individual exhausts all
of his administrative remedies the judiciary cannot intervene and grant
relief. One phase of this principle concerns itself with the necessity of
seeking a rehearing after an administrative tribunal has entered an adverse
decision. While the law as to this particular point has never been entirely
clear, it appears to be well settled that if the statute creating the adminis-
trative agency and its procedure requires a request for a rehearing before
appeal to the courts, it is imperative that the party follow its mandate.6
Since the Public Utilities Act requires the pursuit of such a procedural
step, the only question in this particular case is whether or not the rail-
roads complied. After the 1945 order was entered they acted in accord-
ance with the statute by filing the necessary petition. As a result of that
hearing the 1947 decision was handed down. If it had merely affirmed
the former, obviously an appeal would have been in order since all the
statutory requirements had been met. However, the 1947 ruling was en-
tered upon new evidence submitted during the rehearing and modified its
predecessor in certain respects. The Supreme Court held that this modi-
fication resulted in an entirely new order different from the former and
therefore an additional request for rehearing was necessary. Its rationale
5Ill. Rev. State 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 111/, § 71, provides: "No appeal shall be
allowed from any rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission unless
and until an application for a rehearing thereof shall have been filed with and
acted upon by the Commission." The section continues "No person or corporation
in any appeal shall urge or rely upon any grounds not set forth in such application
for a rehearing before the Commission." In defining the purpose of this latter
provision the Supreme Court, in the recent case of Granite City v. Illinois Commerce
Commission, 407 Ill. 245, 95 N. E. (2d) 371 (1950), stated that it was to require
the party contesting the decision of the tribunal to inform the Commission and
the opposition wherein errors of law and fact were made in the ruling, thus
presenting an adequate basis for a reconsideration. As a result, a petition for
rehearing which merely made general allegations as to the invalidity of an order
was not sufficient compliance with the Act and upon judicial appeal the party
filing such petition would not be allowed to present specific objections to the
Commission's decision.
6 For a general discussion of the problem see Stason, "Timing of Judicial Rem-
edies", 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560 at 570, and 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law.
§ 202.
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was based upon the fact that the issues resolved in the two decisions were
dissimilar. Thus the Commission, in its 1945 order, simply found that the
existing switching rates were reasonable. On the other hand, by allowing
the railroads an increase in the general freight tariffs, the Commission, by
its 1947 ruling, decided an entirely new issue, to wit: that in the light of
the increase in freight rates the existing switching rates were adequate.
ADOPTION-CONSENT Or PARTIES-WHETHER NATURAL PARENT, HAVING
EXECUTED CONSENT TO ADOPTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTORY RE-
QUIREMENTS, MAY WITHDRAW SUCH CONSENT PRIOR TO ENTRY OF DECREE
OF ADOPTION-In the recent case of Dickholtz v. Littfin,1 the Appellate
Court for the First District was presented, for the first time since the
passage of the revised Illinois Adoption Act,2 with the problem of the
revocability of a consent to adoption given by a natural parent where
the consent conforms to statutory requirements. The child there con-
cerned had been born out of wedlock but the natural mother and the
putative father shortly thereafter intermarried. Prior to the marriage, a
petition for adoption had been filed together with a prepared form of
appearance and consent signed by the natural mother. She thereafter
attempted to revoke such appearance and consent, alleging the perpetra-
tion of various acts of a coercive nature which she claimed had been used
to obtain her signature thereto. Petitioners, seeking the adoption, filed an
answer in which they denied that any duress had been used to secure the
consent and also charging the mother with being an unfit person to have
custody of the child. The County Court dismissed the petition for adop-
tion and ordered the child surrendered to the natural mother. Upon ap-
peal, the Appellate Court affirmed the order.
In substantiating such decision, the court proceeded on the theory that
the complete revision in the law produced by the Adoption Act of 1945
was intended by the legislature, among other things, to broaden the scope
of the discretion which the trial court might exercise in adoption proceed-
ings. From the vantage of that starting point, the court examined the
facts, considered the welfare of the child, studied the effect of the inter-
marriage of the natural mother and the putative father upon the question
of illegitimacy, noted the length of the child's residence with the peti-
tioners, and agreed that the trial court had properly exercised its discre-
tion in allowing the parental consent to be revoked. In reaching that
result, the court said: "We do not think that the right to withdraw should
be declared absolute, but rather that it must be left to the sound discre-
1341 Il1. App. 400, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 (1950).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1 et seq.
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tion of the trial court depending upon the peculiar circumstances in each
case.," 3 The importance of the decision lies in the fact that it serves to
place Illinois in line with the majority of other jurisdictions on the ques-
tion as to the right to withdraw a consent prior to the time when the same
has been acted upon.4 By making that right depend on the discretion of
the trial court, to be exercised according to the facts of each case, rather
than by treating the same as an absolute right authorizing withdrawal
solely at the whim of the consenting natural parent, 5 the court has done
much to effectuate an acknowledged legislative purpose.6
BILLS AND NOTES--REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER PERSONAL
DEFENSES ARE AVAILABLE AGAINST AN ACCOMMODATION ENDORSER WHO
HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO PAY THE HOLDER OF A CHECK FOLLOWING DISHONOR
THEREOF BY THE DRAWER-The dispute in the case of Schmetzle v. Trans-
portation Investment Corporation' grew out of an exchange of checks be-
tween the defendant and another who furnished two post-dated checks for
the one in suit but who agreed not to deposit the defendant's check for col-
lection until the post-dated checks had cleared. In violation of such agree-
ment, the payee secured the plaintiff's accommodation, beneath the payee's
signature, and secured cash for the check at another bank than the one on
which the check had been drawn. The post-dated checks were not hon-
ored so the defendant, drawer of the primary check, ordered the drawee
bank to stop payment thereon. The drawee bank refused payment as
ordered, causing the holder bank to demand, and to receive, reimbursement
from the plaintiff, who had acted as accommodation endorser. After tak-
ing a blank endorsement of the check, plaintiff proceeded against the
drawer of the check and was met by the defense of failure of considera-
tion. A summary judgment for the plaintiff in the trial court was affirmed
by the Appellate Court for the Second District.
Plaintiff had claimed to be a holder in due course, so as not to be
s 341 Ill. App. 400 at 405, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 at 92.
4 A minority of states regard the right to withdraw a consent as being absolute
In character. For annotations on the general subject, see 156 A. L. R. 1011 and
138 A. L. R. 1038.
5 In the case of Petition of Thompson, sub nom. Thompson v. Burns, 337 Ill. App.
354, 86 N. E. (2d) 155 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw 308-13, the
court held that an improperly executed consent was insufficient, but proceeded,
by way of dicta, to imply that the right to withdraw the consent was absolute,
at least until decree had been entered. The court in the instant case expressly
rejected this dicta in favor of the majority rule.
6 To that extent, the case follows the view of Nelson v. Nelson, 127 Ill. App. 422
(1906), decided under an earlier statute, where the court held that the fact that
the natural mother had given her consent in the mistaken belief of her impending
death was insufficient to invalidate the same upon her subsequent recovery.
1341 Ill. App. 639, 94 N. E. (2d) 682 (1950).
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subject to the personal defense of failure of consideration existing between
the drawer and the payee,2 but the court properly took the position that
he was not such since he had received the check, under the blank endorse-
ment, knowing that it had been dishonored. For that matter, Section 142
of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Act3 was of little help to the plain-
tiff. That section, in essence, declares that an instrument is not discharged
when paid by a party secondarily liable thereon. Instead, it directs that
such person be remitted to his former position on the instrument as re-
gards all prior parties. While the plaintiff, as an accommodation endorser,
was a secondary party, it was not possible to remit him to any "prior
position" for his signature was not in the chain of title.
No other section of the statute being applicable, and there being no
Illinois precedent squarely in point,4 the court proceeded to decide the
case on the law merchant,5 a body of law which holds that the accommoda-
tion endorser is subrogated to the rights of the holder whom he has paid
off as against all who were parties prior to his accommodation." Thus, even
though the plaintiff could not technically be deemed to be a holder in due
course he was, under the subrogation theory, entitled to rights equal to
those of such a holder for he had no knowledge of any infirmities at the
time of his accommodation endorsement. 7
FIXTURES-REMOVAL-WHETHER OR NOT A RIGHT OF REMOVAL OF Fix-
TURES CONFERRED By LEASE IS LOST BY REASON OF A FORFEITURE OF THE
LFASEHoLD--The case of Getzendaner v. Erbstein' presented the Appellate
Court for the First District with the necessity of ruling on a problem which
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 78.
3 Ibid., Ch. 98, § 142. The court, in circumventing the effect of this section, made
no attempt to interpret that portion which provides an exception to the general
rule laid down therein. The exception states that an accommodating party satis-
fying an instrument made or accepted for accommodation is not remitted to his
former position on the instrument as are other secondary parties under similar
circumstances. Literal interpretation of this section would indicate that it does
not apply to the accommodation endorser.
4 The court referred to the abstract opinion in Graves v. Neeves, 183 Ill. App.
235 (1913), but said it was not possible to tell therefrom whether the maker had
claimed any special defense as against the payee. If not, the problem in the
instant case would be an entirely new one for Illinois.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 244.
6 See Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 P. 287 (1914). That decision confined the
subrogation theory to instances where the accommodation endorser could be termed
an "irregular" one. The instant case drew no such differentiation. In fact, the
plaintiff's signature appeared beneath that of the payee. He would, therefore,
normally be considered to be a "regular" accommodation endorser.
7 For further discussion, see Chafee, "The Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instru-
ment by a Prior Party," 21 Col. L. Rev. 538 (1921), and notes in 28 Harv. L. Rev.
102 and 39 Ill. B. J. 300.
1341 Il. App. 594, 94 N. E. (2d) 746 (1950). Niemeyer, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
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has been resolved in many jurisdictions2 but which has never previously
been decided in Illinois. A lessor had there given a lease for a term upon
the understanding that the lessee was to add to the improvements but was
to have the privilege of removing such additions "at the expiration" of
the term so created. During the term, the lessor served the tenant with a
statutory five-day notice for possession because of non-payment of rent3
and followed up such notice with a forcible entry and detainer proceed-
ing. A judgment for possession was duly obtained. When the tenant
was served with a writ of restitution based on such judgment, she at-
tempted to remove the fixtures which she had added pursuant to the lease
but was forcibly prevented from so doing by the landlord. The tenant
thereafter filed the instant action against the landlord to recover as for a
conversion of the fixtures. A motion to strike the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action was sustained but, on appeal from that ruling, the
Appellate Court, with one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded the
case.
The majority of the court recognized the doctrine that a tenant for
a definite term is ordinarily aware that all of his rights under the lease
will be extinguished on a day certain, hence is not prejudiced by a require-
ment that he remove any fixtures he wishes to retain during the defined
period or else lose his rights therein.4  Where, however, the tenancy comes
to an end prior to the normal expiration of the lease, as by the successful
prosecution of a forcible entry and detainer proceeding, the majority felt
the same certainty of termination would not appear until after judgment
had been rendered therein, hence it considered it proper to recognize a
right of removal for a reasonable period after the date of such termination.
5
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, laid stress on the fact that the
statutory right conferred on the tenant to remove his fixtures6 is limited
to those cases where the possession is retained lawfully by him in his char-
acter as a tenant.7 He believed that, as the plaintiff had wilfully breached
the contract, her possession was unlawful" especially after a judgment for
possession had been obtained, hence she should not be entitled to a greater
2 See annotations in 6 A. L. R. (2d) 322, 39 A. L. R. 1099 and L. R. A. 1918A
835.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 80, § S.
4 O'Connell v. Fay, 186 Ill. App. 113 (1914).
5 There is dicta to that effect in Fellows v. Johnson, 183 Ill. App. 42 (1913), but
the tenant there concerned had agreed to an earlier cancellation of the lease upon
six months' notice. See also Berger v. Horner, 36 Ill. App. 360 (1889).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 89, § 34.
7 Savage v. University State Bank, 263 Ill. App. 457 (1931) :Miller v. Bennett,
239 111. App. 306 (1925) ; Radcliff v. Hanger, 239 Ill. App. 292 (1925) ; Fellows v.
Johnson, 183 Ill. App. 42 (1913).
8 Balaban & Katz Corp. v. Channel Amusement Co., 336 Ill. App. 113, 83 N. E.
(2d) 27 (1948) ; Dreicke v. People's Lumber Co., 107 Ill. App. 285 (1903).
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right than would be granted to a tenant who had fully performed his
covenants.
There is some evidence of an effort on the part of the majority of the
court to do substantial justice between the parties. Such being the case,
the decision, if upheld, should go to alleviate some of the harshness of the
common law rule which compelled a tenant to lose his right to remove his
fixtures when, because of some act or omission, he had forfeited his interest
under the lease. Express language in the lease to that end would seem to
be necessary, hereafter, if such a penalty is to be imposed on the defaulting
tenant.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-CIVIL DAMAGE LAWS-WHETHER OR NOT THE
DRA M SHOP ACT ALLOWS A RECOVERY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT .OF AN
ACCIDENT OCCURRING IN A SISTER STATE-For the first time in Illinois, a
plaintiff requested that the Dram Shop Act' be given extraterritorial effect.
In Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 2 the following facts were alleged:
that the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by Slaughter;
that Slaughter while under the influence of intoxicating liquor purchased
from the defendant in Chicago drove into the side of a truck in Hammond,
Indiana; that the accident was due to Slaughter's intoxication; and that, by
reason of the collision, the plaintiff was injured. The defendant moved for
a dismissal of the suit, claiming that since the accident had occurred in
Indiana an action under the Illinois statute could not be maintained. The
trial court granted the motion and, upon appeal, the judgment was affirmed
by the Appellate Court for the First District.
The court, in reaching its decision, alluded to the fact that the Illinois
Dram Shop Act contains no specific provision extending its scope to in-
stances where the act causing the injury occurred in a sister state. In re-
fusing to extend the explicit words of the statute in such a situation the
court recognized that its conclusion was supported by commonly accepted
rules of statutory interpretation. Thus it is well established that a statute
should not be given extraterritorial effect except where the legislature has
expressly provided for such an extension.8 Then, too, since the Act in
' Chicago Trust Co. v. 12-14 WV. Washington St. Bldg. Corp., 278 Ill. App. 117
(19:34).
1 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 43, § 135, provides: "Every . . . person . . .
injured, in person or property . . . by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action
against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, have
caused the intoxication . . . of such person."
2342 II1. App. 151, 95 N. E. (2d) 512 (1950).
3 Union Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 Ill. 396, 122
N. E. 609 (1919).
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question is to some degree penal in nature' and is in derogation of the
common law, the strict construction utilized by the court appears to be
appropriate. As the result of this decision both the intoxication and
tortious act must occur within the boundaries of Illinois before an action
under the Dram Shop Act can be maintained.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - PROPERTY - WHETHER STATUTE AUTHOR-
IZING A MUNICIPALITY TO ACQUIRE LAND FOR PURPOSE OF PROVIDING OFF-
STREET PARKING FACILITIES IS CONSTITUTIONAL--By passage of an ordi-
nance, the City of Kankakee indicated its intention to exercise the special
power of eminent domain allegedly conferred upon it and other Illinois
cities by an amendment to the Cities and Villages Act,1 with a view toward
acquiring eight tracts of real estate in the business section of the city for
use as off-street parking lots. Thereafter, certain persons, including the
owner and operator of a private parking lot, filed suit to prevent the city
officials from proceeding under the ordinance on the theory that the basic
statute was void because it authorized the taking of property for a private
use in violation of both the state constitution2 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The trial court, after hearing
evidence, decreed that the ordinance and Section 8 of the statute were in-
valid, upheld the constitutionality of the balance of the basic act, and
issued the injunction. Both sides then took a direct appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court under a certificate that the validity of both a statute and
an ordinance was involved. That court, in Poole v. City of Kankakee,3
found the measures to be constitutional and ordered the injunction dis-
solved.
Starting from the premise that it is a legislative function to decide
whether a public necessity exists' and that a court should inquire only as
to whether or not the use authorized by the statute is a public one,5 the
court readily found that the statute contemplated a taking of land for a
public purpose, The enormous increase, over the years, in the number of
4 However, it is considered remedial to the extent that it cures a defect in the
common law by allowing a recovery from one who would not have otherwise sus-
tained any liability but who contributes to a certain extent to the resultant injury.
'Laws 1947, p. 499, as amended by Laws 1949, p. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol.
1, Ch. 24, §§ 52.1-1 to 52.1-10.
2 Il. Const. 1870, Art. II, §13, and Art. IV, § 20, were particularly called upon to
support the claim of unconstitutionality.
3 406 Ill. 521, 94 N. E. (2d) 416 (1950).
4 Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 377 Ill. 208, 36 N. E. (2d)
245 (1941) ; Village of Depue v. Banschbach, 273 Ill. 574, 113 N. E. 156 (1916).
5 People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 68 N. E. (2d) 761 (1946).
All courts agree that the determination of whether a given use is or is not a
public use forms part of the judicial function.
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automobiles in operation has created traffic problems of national concern.
Outmoded and narrow streets in business areas of cities are clogged daily
by a degree of traffic congestion which strangles movement, harms busi-
ness and directly affects the safety of those who must use the streets. In
addition, emergency cars, ambulances, police, and fire vehicles are fre-
quently delayed from reaching the scene of emergency or danger because
of such conditions. Any legislative action of the type in question, being
designed to alleviate traffic congestion, could well be said to be responsive
to the public need.
It had also been urged that the statute improperly purported to
give authority to the municipality to lease the parking lots so acquired,
hence resulted in a taking for a private use. Any such use was said to
be merely incidental to the public purpose manifested in the statute and
would not result in creating purely private benefits.' In much the same
way, the court overcame the argument that the use was necessarily private,
because it enabled the municipality to enter into direct competition with
individuals engaged in a private calling, by noting that the presence of
private garages in the area did not prevent the operation of public ga-
rages if public necessity required their existence. 7  The legislature, by
passing the basic statute, and the court, by holding it constitutional, have
done much to bring about a solution for the problem which burdens every
Illinois city.
MUNICIPAL CORPOPATIONS-ToRTs-WHETnER POLICE OFFICER OF MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATION IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR His NEGLIGENCE
WHEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN PERFORMANCE oF His DuTrIs-The
effect that a 1945 amendment to the Cities and Villages Act' is to have
upon the personal liability of police officers has been indicated by the hold-
ing in Both v. Collins.2 The plaintiffs there were injured when the auto-
mobile in which they were riding was struck by a police car negligently
6 People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N. E. 419 (1932) ; Barsaloux v. City
of Chicago, 245 Ill. 598, 92 N. E. 525 (1910).
7 Compare the instant case with the holding in People ex rel. Current v. Wood,
391 Ill. 305, 62 N. E. (2d) 809, 161 A. L. R. 718 (1945).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-15. The statute makes a municipality
having a population of 500,000 or over the indemnitor to a police officer against
whom a judgment has been recovered for ". . . any injury . . . while the member is
engaged in the performance of his duties as policeman . . ." For a discussion of a
somewhat comparable problem relating to firemen, see note to Hansen v. Raleigh,
391 Ill. 536, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 (1945), in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 257-62.
2339 Ill. App. 437, 90 N. E. (2d) 285 (1950). The facts in the later case of
Erickson v. Fitzgerald, 342 Ill. App. 223, 96 N. E. (2d) 382, a case achieving the
same result as the instant one, do not clearly indicate the nature of the function
being performed by the police officer other than to note that he was "operating
a police car in the performance of a governmental function."
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operated by the defendant who was, at the time, on his way to a police
station to interrogate a criminal suspect. The Appellate Court for the
First District, after reversing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the
ground of error not here pertinent, proceeded to dispose of a claim of im-
munity pressed on it by the defendant in order to aid the trial court in
the conduct of the new trial there ordered. The defendant had relied
primarily upon the case of Taylor v. City of Berwyn,' in which the ques-
tion had been presented as to whether or not a police officer, in fresh pur-
suit of certain felony suspects, was engaged in a governmental function.
It having been decided that he was, the court then refused to hold him
liable for injuries growing out of his negligent operation of a police car
in the course of that pursuit. The doctrine of immunity from tort liability
when engaged in performance of governmental functions is well established
with regard to municipalities4 as well as to other governmental agencies,
but the Taylor case was apparently the first in which the immunity was
extended to protect the negligent police officer personally.
As neither the officer nor the municipality, after the holding in the
Taylor case, would be liable to respond in damages to the injured person,
the legislature, in 1943, enacted a provision which repealed any immunity
favoring the municipal corporation for injuries caused by the negligent
operation of motor vehicles driven by members of police departments while
on duty,5 but presumably left the officer still protected. The statute was
again amended in 1945, this time to make it apply to "any injury" in-
flicted by the police officer, whether by motor vehicle or not, but the cor-
porate liability was changed to that of indemnitor on any judgment pro-
nounced against the officer.' It would seem that the legislative intent must
have been to extend the liability of the police officer, and correspondingly
lessen the immunity, otherwise there could be no judgment requiring in-
demnity. Whether or not the statute nullified the holding in the Taylor
case, the instant case has certainly operated to minimize the scope thereof
for it establishes liability on the officer's part for injuries resulting from
his negligent operation of a motor vehicle when not in "fresh pursuit".
By implication, at least, it also casts doubt upon the continued validity of
the holding in the Taylor case and, when a proper situation arises, may
help lead to the reversal thereof.
3 372 Ill. 124, 22 N. E. (2d) 930 (1939).
4 In general, see Green, "Freedom from Litigation," 38 111. L. Rev. 3i55 (1944).
5 11. liev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 1-15. The statute then provided that only the
municipality was to be liable for "any injury . . . caused by the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle by a member of the police department."
6 Laws 1945, p. 477.
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VENuE-NATUR.E OR SUBJECT OF ACTION-WHETHIER OR NOT AN OBJEC-
TION TO VENUE MAY BE RAISED BY A DENIAL TYPE OF ANswER-The plain-
tiff in Dever v. Bowers' filed a complaint inca wrongful death action in
Gallatin County against two defendants, neither of whom were residents
thereof. The complaint charged that the death occurred in a collision at an
indicated point on an Illinois highway. That highway followed the county
line between Gallatin and White counties but, at the trial, there was evi-
dence that the accident had happened on that part of the road located in
White County.2 The defendants, without utilizing any preliminary mo-
tion, filed an answer categorically denying each paragraph of the com-
plaint. The ensuing trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. On appeal therefrom, the defendants assigned error on the
ground the trial court was without jurisdiction as the record showed that
the deceased had crossed the center line of the road into White County
prior to the moment of the collision, hence no part of the transaction out
of which the action arose had occurred in Gallatin County. Tile Appellate
Court for the Fourth District, nevertheless, affirmed the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.
The defendants had argued that no preliminary motion to test the
jurisdiction was necessary as they had a right to raise the matter by an
answer,3 event though an attack might have been offered by a motion based
on Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act.4  They also relied on the proposi-
tion that a failure to raise a defense of the type in question by motion did
not preclude them from raising that defense by answer.5 The court, while
not accepting the premise that a motion under Section 48 would be a
proper way to raise an objection to venue,6 agreed that the defendants
1341 Ill. App. 444, 94 N. E. (2d) 518 (1950).
2 If the accident had occurred in Gallatin County, plaintiff's choice of place for
suit would have been proper under the election provided by 111. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110. § 131. which permits the bringing of suit where one or more of the
defendants reside or where "the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of
which the cause of action arose."
3 Defendants undoubtedly labored under the belief that, by denying the allega-
tions in the complaint in categorical fashion, they thereby denied every allegation
set forth in the complaint, including the venue allegations, so as to raise an issue
concerning venue or jurisdiction.
4 111. Rev. Stat. 1949. Vol. 2, Ch. 110. § 172(b), indicates the use of a motion where
the "court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter . . .
5 Ibid., C. 110, § 172(4), so states.
6 There would seem to be some confusion over the meaning to be ascribed to
certain of the grounds listed in the statute to support a motion filed under Section
48 of the Civil Practice Act. The court in the instant case, with all correctness.
indicated that the specific ground that "the court has not jurisdiction of the subject
matter" relates only to matters concerning inherent jurisdiction, or the power to
hear and determine the type of case presented, as distinguished from jurisdiction
in terms of venue. See 21 C. J. S., Courts, §§ 15c and 23. For confusion as to the
meaning of the words "capacity to sue," used in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 172(c), see Classen v. Heil, 330 Iil. App. 433, 71 N. E. (2d) 537 (1947). and
comments thereon in 26 CI-ncAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 38-9 and 36 Ill. B. J. 194.
Elaboration upon statutory language may be desirable in the interest of clarity.
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had the right to preserve the venue objection by answer, particularly since
the statute now permits the pleading of matter in abatement, such as lack
of venue, along with matter in bar of the action.7
The significance of the case, however, lies in the fact that the court,
while it recognized that the defendants were entitled to proceed as they
had done, found the denial form of answer insufficient to raise any issue
as to matters relating to venue.8 In that regard, the court required that
the answer should disclose compliance with certain particulars both as
to form and allegation, namely: (1) the objection to venue should be sep-
arately designated ;9 (2) the answer should be specific as to the facts per-
taining to the matter in abatement;1O and (3) the objection raised had to
be insisted upon at the trial on the merits in order that there be no waiver
of the defense. 1 The particularity required of defenses in abatement under
the former procedure 2 has not, apparently, been changed in any substan-
tial fashion by anything to be found in the Civil Practice Act.
13
WILLS--CONSTRUCTION-WHETHER OR NOT BEQUEST OF MONEY ON
DEPOSIT INCLUDES MONEY CONTAINED IN TESTATOR'S SAFETY Box LOCATED
IN VAULT OF A BANKING INSTITUTION-The Supreme Court of Illinois,
having granted leave to appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court
for the First District in the case of Lavin v. Banks,' followed up that
action by reversing the decision of the Appellate Court. The case had re-
7 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(3).
8 See Baxter v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 1, 95 S. W. 856 (1906), to the
point that a denial type of answer, comparable to the general issue of the common
law pleading system, does not serve to formulate any issue as to matters properly
presentable under a defense in abatement.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(1).
1o Gillian v. Gray, 14 Ill. 416 (1853).
11 The possibility that an error in venue may be cured by a failure to assert the
same is acknowledged by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 135.
12 People's Bank of Bloomington v. Wood, 193 Il. App. 442 (1914), provides a
good illustration of the meticulousness required in dilatory pleading.
13 The defendants in the instant case apparently recognized the error in venue
prior to pleading, hence were in a position to take advantage thereof during the
pleading stage. If the error had not become apparent until during the course of
the trial, and there was no culpable negligence on the part of the defendants in
not ascertaining the facts prior to that time, the trial court might have, in keeping
with the spirit of the Civil Practice Act, permitted withdrawal of the answer to the
merits or the amendment thereof, so as to allow assertion of the defense in abate-
ment thus disclosed. The factual situation, however, suggests that It might be
desirable to amend the venue provisions of the Civil Practice Act to assimilate
civil procedure with the rule formerly existing as to criminal prosecutions for
crimes committed on or near county lines: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 704.
1406 Ill. 605, 94 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950), reversing 338 Ill. App. 612, 88 N. E. (2d)
512 (1949), criticized in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 175.
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quired a construction of a provision in a testator's will, one by which he
had bequeathed to his wife "all monies on deposit in my name in any bank
or banking institution," as the same might have bearing on the right to a
substantial amount of cash found in a safety deposit box rented by the
testator in the vault of a safety deposit company which was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of, and located within premises operated by, a banking
institution. The trial court had decreed that the money in question did
not pass to the widow. The Appellate Court, affording a liberal construc-
tion in favor of the widow because she was the legatee named to receive the
disputed bequest, 2 reversed and adopted the opposite construction on the
ground that the ordinary testator would not distinguish between a bank
and its subsidiary safety deposit company, particularly when the latter
was to all appearances a component part of the former.8 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed and reinstated the trial court decision.
It decided that the controlling rule of construction to be applied was
one which called for the giving of an ordinary meaning to the words em-
ployed by the testator in order to determine his intent at the time of
making the bequest in question.4 It reasoned, in the light of this principle,
that the term "money on deposit" in a bank described more nearly the
customary relationship of debtor and creditor which arises between a bank
and a depositor whereby the bank assumes control over the money so de-
posited and, in return, gives the depositor the right to withdraw not the
same money but an equivalent amount from the account. The dissimilarity
between this relationship and the one which exists between a box renter
and a safe deposit company, one under which the customer places valuables
in a receptacle for safekeeping but, more significantly, retains complete
control over his property, is quite marked. The cash in question may
have been deposited, i. e. placed in the safety deposit box within the bank
building, but it was not "on deposit" in the bank in the usually accepted
sense of that term.
2 See 69 C. J., Wills, § 1151. The Supreme Court refused to apply this rule be-
cause the record did not reveal the value of the property the widow would take
under the will nor the value which would attach to her interest if there had been
no will or if she had renounced its benefits. The rule that favors a construction
which most nearly conforms to the law of inheritance, ilustrated by Dahmer v.
Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799, 94 A. L. R. 1 (1932), was said to be inappro-
priate for the same reasons.
3 The Appellate Court had relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 334 et
seq., which regulates the keeping and letting of safety deposit boxes but which is
expressly made inapplicable to state and national banks whose vaults are deemed
an integral part of the banking business, as justifying the result attained.
4 Stagg v. Phenix, 401 Ill. 134, 81 N. E. (2d) 565 (1948).
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WILLS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER AN AGREEMENT DE-
SIGNED TO EXTINGUISH A MORTGAGE DEBT UPON THE DEATH OF THE MORT-
GAGEE IS TO BE, REGARDED AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION REQUIRING AT-
TENTION TO THE FORMALITIES OF A WILL-The administrator of a mort-
gagee's estate sought, in Miller v. Allen,' to forecolse a purchase money
mortgage which provided that the note secured thereby should be consid-
ered as fully paid on the mortgagee's death, if such death occurred before
full payment of the debt had been made. The defendant-mortgagor, who
relied on the provision for discharge as a defense to the suit, had been a
tenant on the mortgagee 's farm for more than twenty years prior to the
time when it was conveyed to him on purchase money mortgage and this
rather unusual agreement was made.2  When reversing a trial court de-
cision in favor of plaintiff, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District
rejected the argument that the provision for discharge of the mortgage con-
stituted an attempted testamentary disposition which was ineffective be-
cause of non-compliance with statutory requirements relating to wills.
3 It
was, instead, held that a mortgage containing such a stipulation amounted
to a valid contract conferring a present, binding right on the promisee-
mortgagor over which the promisor-mortgagee no longer had any control. 4
The decision marks acceptance by Illinois, with possible reservations,
of a majority view which upholds the validity of agreements of this
character provided the same are contemporaneous with the creation of
the debt or legal obligation., The court was, however, faced with the
apparently contrary precedent of Jernings v. Neville.' In that old case,
a father who held several notes of his son had agreed that, in case the
son should pay two bequests upon the father's death, the notes should
be cancelled. It was there held that, even though the agreement was
executed on the same day as the giving of the notes, the agreement was
testamentary in character and, being such, was ineffectual because not
executed according to the statute relating to wills. The court in the
1 339 IIl. App. 471, 90 N. E. (2d) 251 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 It would appear, from the synopses of the cases dealing with such agreements
as listed in 127 A. L. I. G35, that the creditor and debtor are more often related
to one another as. for example, father and son.
3 Covenants in a mortgage made binding on a mortgagee are rare, but would
usually be upheld, even without the mortgagee's signature. on the same basis as is
used in ease of covenants or assumption agreements in a deed poll. The absence
of signature and attestation. however, would prevent the instrument from operating
as a will: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1. Ch. 3, § 194.
4 Although most decisions upholding the validity of such agreements have beenl
predicated on the theory that the agreement constitutes a valid and enforcihle
(ojitract, validity has sometimes been justified on the theory that a valid gift
has been made thereby: 127 A. L. R. 635.
5 The cases adopting both the majority and the minority views on this prol)lem
are collected in an annotation in 127 A. L. R. 635.
6 180 Ill. 270, 54 N. E. 202 (1899).
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instant case, declaring that the Jennings case was not a precedent and
that "no exact precedent" had been directed to its attention,7 dismissed
that case with an observation to the effect that the parties in the Jennings
case were attempting to put into effect a prior will which had been de-
stroyed, from which it could be inferred that a testamentary disposition
was intended by the agreement. The court also observed that the notes
giving rise to the son's legal obligation were not conditioned in any manner
at the time of their execution. By contrast, it was said that the note
and mortgage in the instant case "contained the precise conditions re-
lating to payment of such obligations.' '
Language utilized by the court in the instant case certainly does
not make it any too clear why the holding therein did not, in effect,
amount to a refusal to follow the position taken by the former Illinois
Supreme Court in the Jennings case.9 Certain of the vague distinctions
which the court draws would seem to indicate that an agreement to
extinguish, at the death of the creditor, a contemporaneously incurred
debt would have to be executed as a w~ill in order to be valid, if the
parties to the agreement had a testamentary intent at the time of the
making thereof, but not if they were simply in a bargaining frame of
mind. Such an intent, apparently, would have to be established by ex-
trinsic evidence for the existence of such an agreement, by itself, would
ordinarily tend to prove merely a contractual state of mind. Yet the
nature of the agreement is so unusual, even foreign to the customary
creditor-debtor situation, as almost to force the conclusion that the
creditor's primary purpose was one of testamentary character. In addi-
tion, while it is clear that, to be valid, the agreement must be made
contemporaneously with the debt, the exact meaning to be given to the
term "contemporaneously" is not made too clear. The decision in the
Jennings case would seem to make it evident that such an agreement
is not necessarily valid even though it be made on the same day that
the legal obligation is incurred.
7 No mention was made of two Appellate Courts decisions dealing with the same
type of problem. In May v. May, 36 Ill. App. 77 (1890), a maker of notes de-
fended against a suit thereon, after his father's death, on the ground that the
father, payee, had agreed that at the payee's death the notes were to be dis-
charged. The court there held the transaction to be a incomplete gift, there
being an intention to give but no delivery. Mathews v. Mathews, 86 111. App. 654
(1900). uphobls the validity of an agreement between a father and son to the
effect that a note of the son held by the father would be cancelled on the father's
death. That agreement was held to be neither a gift nor a testamentary devise but
a valid contract. While the holding therein would seemingly contradict the decisions
in the May -and Jennings cases, the opinion makes no mention of either of these
cases.
8 :3.9 Ill. App. 471 at 474, 90 N. E. (2d) 251 at 253.
9 The present court, judged by its denial of leave to appeal from the instant deci-
sion. may also be indicating a willingness to reject the former holding.
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